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1  Introduction 
 
In the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
distortionary effects of domestic farm programs figured high on the negotiating agenda. Along 
with the export subsidies and market access, domestic farm policies were targeted for reductions 
in support. Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), domestic support is 
classified into three categories or boxes according to their supposed impact on international 
trade. According to URAA conventions, the amber-box contains the most distorting subsidies, 
and, hence, limits to their use have been agreed. Blue-box payments also cause some distortion 
but are required to be production limiting. The green-box contains subsidies that  are classified as 
being minimally trade distorting. The subsidies in the blue- and green-boxes are excluded from 
all World Trade Organization (WTO) disciplines − are excluded from the Aggregate Measure of 
Support  − and are expected to have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects on 
production. Decoupled support policies which are defined as payments that are financed by 
taxpayers and are not related to current production, factor use, or prices, and for which eligibility 
criteria are defined by a fixed, historical base period, are categorized as green-box payments. 
Since they are exempt from WTO disciplines, payments considered to be decoupled have been 
providing a growing and important share of the total support to agriculture provided by 
governments. The extent to which exempted policies really are production and trade neutral has, 
however, recently come under increasing scrutiny. It is hypothesized that there are various 
mechanisms by which decoupled payments may affect production decisions. 
The literature addresses six major channels through which decoupled payments could 
affect production. They ease credit constraints faced by farmers (when capital market are 
imperfect); they affect the labour allocation decisions of farm households (when labour market 2 
 
are imperfect); they alter land values, rents and land prices or influence the entry and exit 
decisions of farmers; they influence farmers decisions through expectations about future 
payments; and they may affect the risk faced by farmers. Hennessy (1998) developed a 
theoretical framework for the analysis of agricultural income support policies under uncertainty. 
He showed that for decoupled payments, which tend to increase expected profit as well as to 
contract the variability of profit, decreasing absolute risk aversion is sufficient to ensure an 
increase in production. He introduced two effects of decoupled payments that would not arise in 
a certain world: the wealth effect and the insurance effect. The former means that the higher 
average income arising from the support policy may affect producer decisions. The latter refers 
to the income-stabilizing attribute that may affect optimizing decisions.   
The main objective of this study is to investigate whether Canadian whole farm 
programs, which have been designed with the WTO rules in mind, are actually  decoupled. To 
accomplish this objective, a theoretical and empirical framework which consider the risk effects 
of these types of programs is developed.  
In this study the expected utility maximization model of Chavas and Holt (1990) is 
modified to examine the effects of Canadian support programs on acreage decisions for major 
crops in the prairie provinces over 1970-2006. By developing  theoretical restrictions, we 
contribute to the literature on supply response by adding the insurance effect (income 
stabilization) emphasized in the literature (Hennessy, 1998), which was  ignored by Chavas and 
Holt model (1990), into our theoretical model. Hence, the acreage response equation is specified 
as a function of expected crop profits, elements of the variance-covariance matrix of profits, 
expected total wealth − initial wealth plus market profit, and variance of total wealth, among 
other variables. Furthermore, government payments are incorporated into the model through 3 
 
truncation of the probability distribution of profits. Specifically, the whole-farm programs 
truncate the total (farm) profit distribution which affect the expected total wealth and variance of 
total wealth. Within this model, a system of nine crop equations is provided and all the relevant 
elasticities of acreage allocation with respect to the exogenous variables are estimated. If the 
coefficient of expected total wealth and variance of total wealth variables are statistically 
significant (insignificant) in the whole system, the whole-farm programs are (are not) production 
and therefore trade distorting and are not (are) decoupled. The statistically significant coefficient 
are used to simulate the impact of recent whole-farm programs − the Net Income Stabilization 
Account (NISA) and the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) − on crop choices.  
The next section presents a selected literature review. This is followed by  the theoretical 
framework used in this study. Section 4 contains the empirical model with the data description 
and the results. Finally, conclusions and policy implications are presented in section 5. 
 
2  Literature Review 
 
While it can be theoretically  shown that decoupled payments have no impact on farm 
profit maximization decisions in a deterministic world with perfect markets and risk neutral 
producers, an extensive literature suggests that payments designated as decoupled in the WTO 
can indirectly affect production and trade. 
If credit markets are imperfect (for example, the existence of a significant gap between 
borrowing and lending rates and/or the presence of binding debt constraints for the farmer 
willing to invest), decoupled payments have the potential to increase the liquidity of credit 
constrained farmers and so will affect production decisions (Barry, Bierlen and Sotomayor, 
2000; Roe, Somwaru, and Diao, 2003). The payments also increase land values and rents, which 
also improves the credit worthiness of credit-constrained farmers and lead them to keep land in 4 
 
agriculture (Dewbre, Anton and Thompson, 2001; Frandsen, Gersfelt and Jensen, 2003; 
Goodwin, Mishra and Ortalo-Magne, 2003; Gohin, 2006). Decoupled payments affect farmer 
expectations by linking current decisions to future payments (Lagerkvist, 2005; McIntosh, 
Shogren and Dohlman, 2007; Coble, Miller and Hudson, 2007). Support programs that are 
directly based on previous production, e.g. output last year, have a built-in dynamic aspect, since 
the farmer can directly affect next year’s payments with today’s production decision. If labour 
market is imperfect (for example a wage gap between on-farm and off-farm returns), decoupled 
payments affect labour markets by influencing the on- and off-farm labour supply decisions and 
so will affect agricultural production (El-Osta, Mishra, and Ahearn, 2004; Ahearn, El-Osta, and 
Dewbre, 2006). In the presence of uncertainty, decoupled payments affects the total wealth of the 
farmer and this change in wealth can affect the farmers'attitude to risk (risk aversion). The way 
in which wealth affects risk aversion depends on assumptions concerning the utility function. If 
absolute risk aversion is reduced by the wealth effect (Decreasing Risk Absolute Aversion 
(DARA) assumption), farmers will be willing to assume more risk and therefore will produce 
more. Decoupled payments may affect the degree of risk faced by the farmer. The idea is that a 
policy reducing the risk faced by the farmer will have a positive effect on production. It can be 
proved that a government scheme that increases payments when prices fall and reduces payments 
when prices rise will increase production if there is partial income compensation for the price 
movements. Chavas and Holt ,1990; Massow and Weersink, 1993; Hennessy, 1998; Burfisher, 
Robinson, and Thierfelder, 2000; Serra, Zilberman, Goodwin, and Featherstone, 2006; Goodwin 
and Mishra, 2006; Coyle, Wei and Rude, 2008, among others, have examined the production 
impact of decoupled payments by incorporating risk. In what follows, we present some studies 
pertaining to the impact of decoupled payments on production through the use of a risk 5 
 
mechanism. 
Chavas and Holt (1990) study the impact of U.S. price support programs on acreage 
decisions under risk, for corn and soybeans from 1954 to 1985. They develop an acreage supply 
response model under an expected utility maximization of wealth framework for a farm 
household subject to budget and acreage constraints.  They derive an  optimal acreage decision 
for a farm household as a function of expected net returns for the own and competing crops, 
second moment of the distribution of the net returns, and initial wealth. Then, through examining 
theoretical restrictions, total wealth (initial wealth plus market returns) as well as expected crop 
net returns and variance-covariance of crop prices appears in the model specified for estimation. 
The effect of a price support program is incorporated into the model by truncation of the the 
price distribution. 
Variances and covariances of crop prices (a proxy for risk) are found to be statistically 
significant in most cases. Elasticities with respect to initial wealth are statistically significant and 
0.087 for corn and 0.270 for soybeans. The hypothesis of constant absolute risk aversion over the 
period of analysis for corn and soybean farmers is rejected and the positive wealth effect is 
consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion. In order to show the importance of considering 
risk in a multicrop framework, the authors simulate the acreage response models at various price 
support levels for corn and soybeans. Due to the truncation effects, changing the support price 
levels will influence the means, variances and covariances of prices.  The model simulations 
indicate that there is some range over which increasing the support price for corn will result in 
more acres planted to soybeans because the risk reducing effect of a price support program 
influencing acreage substitution dominates the mean price effect. This result emphasizes the 
importance of cross-commodity risk effects and the risk-reducing role of government support 6 
 
payments. 
Massow and Weersink (1993) assess the impact of government support programs on 
acreage response under price and production risk in the province of Ontario in Canada from 1965 
to 1990. Following Chavas and Holt, they start from the maximization of the expected utility of 
wealth and derive the optimal acreage decisions as a function of initial wealth, expected profit 
for the own and competing crops, and the expectations of the higher moments of the profit 
distributions. In order to incorporate the effect of government programs, the authors truncate the 
subjective price and yield distributions at the support level. Estimation of the system of acreage 
response functions for white beans, corn, soybeans and winter wheat indicates that the signs of 
variables are generally consistent with theory. The change in acreage of all four crops due to 
changes in the expected variability of the revenues is less than acreage changes due to changes in 
levels of expected revenues, which shows the impact of risk relative to expected returns. 
The null hypothesis that farmers are risk-neutral is rejected which indicates the need to 
include some measure of risk in acreage response models. The constant absolute risk aversion 
hypothesis is also rejected which implies the need to include a wealth variable in acreage 
response estimations. Using the estimated coefficients, the authors simulate various government 
policy scenarios over 1980-1989 to measure how any scenario will affect the average expected 
revenue and variability of revenue and therefore the crop acreages. The results indicate that the 
National Tripartite Stabilization Program (NTSP) had the most potential to affect acreage 
decisions, considerably increasing the level of white bean acreage by 24.3 per cent. The 
Agricultural Stabilization Act (ASA) increased average corn acreages by 2.9 per cent at the 
expense of the portfolio of alternative crops. Although the Gross Revenue Insurance Program 
(GRIP) had the least potential for misallocation of land among crops since it provided a 7 
 
consistent measure of support to all of the crops, it produced an acreage response of 3.6 per cent, 
on average. 
Miranda, Novak and Lerohl (1994) examine the effect of the Canadian Western Grains 
Stabilization Program (WGSP) on acreage response. They estimate a nonlinear rational 
expectations model of aggregate acreage supply (for six major grain crops) for the Canadian 
Prairie between 1976 and 1990 by accounting directly for a structural model of the WGSP in 
their estimation framework. An aggregate acreage supply equation is considered as a function of 
expected revenue and the variance of revenue. A system of grain market equations including 
grain price, grain marketings, on-farm dispositions, and yield is estimated. Using the estimated 
parameters which give the western Canadian grain market equations and nine deterministic 
structural equations which describe WGSP payouts, rational ex ante expectation and variance of 
per hectare revenues are computed by Gauss-Hermite numerical integration methods. Then, the 
effect of ex ante means and variance of per hectare revenues on acreage response is estimated. 
Finally, using the estimated coefficients, the impact of the WGSP on acreage decisions was 
simulated by computing ex ante means and variance of revenues with WGSP implementation 
and without WGSP implementation. The results indicate that the WGSP increased acreage 
planted to eligible crops by over 4 per cent during its 15 years of operation. Most of this increase 
(2.4 per cent) was related to the risk (variances of revenue) reduction effects of the program, the 
remainder (1.7 per cent) to increases in expected revenues. 
Lin and Dismukes (2007) examine whether the Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCPs) in the 
U.S. 2002 Farm Act have an impact on farmers’ acreage decisions. Following the theoretical 
framework developed by Chavas and Holt, the acreage response model – both the linear acreage 
and acreage share specifications - under return risk is estimated using seemingly unrelated 8 
 
regression for major program crops (corn, soybeans, and wheat) in the North Central region 
(including eight states) during 1991-2001. Truncated means, variances and covariances of per 
unit crop prices are calculated to reflect government support provided to farmers through 
marketing loan programs and counter-cyclical payments. The results indicate that the expected 
net returns variables have, for the most part, a sign consistent with theory. The null hypothesis 
that coefficients of all risk variables in each acreage equation are jointly zero is rejected in the 
soybean equation suggesting the importance of risk in farmers’ soybean acreage decisions. It is 
not rejected in the corn and wheat acreage equations. The null hypothesis that all coefficients of 
the initial wealth variable are jointly zero is rejected, which shows that wealth has an important 
effect on farmers' acreage decisions. Overall, an increase in initial wealth will lead to an increase 
in acreage planted to all crops, which implies that farmers exhibit decreasing absolute risk 
aversion. Using the estimated coefficients in a linear acreage model, the authors simulate the 
effects of counter-cyclical payments on acreage decisions for 2005 in major field crops in Illinois 
by comparing two scenarios: market conditions without counter-cyclical payments, and market 
conditions with counter-cyclical payments. The effect of counter-cyclical payments on acreages 
appears to be small, with an increase of 80,000 acres for corn and 50,000 acres for wheat while 
soybean acreage remains unchanged. However, the authors mention that the effects of CCPs may 
go beyond their short-run effects on farmers’ acreage decisions; longer term, there may be 
structural implications to the extent that these payments keep farmers in business. 
Hennessy (1998) develops a theoretical framework to show the production effects of 
income support programs in stochastic environments. He models a risk-averse farmer, 
maximizing expected utility from profit. The farmer earns support-adjusted profit which is the 
summation of stochastic profit from the market and a decoupled payment. The model 9 
 
decomposes the production impacts of income support programs under uncertainty into wealth, 
insurance, and coupling effects. Under the conditions that (i) farmer's preferences display 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, (ii) the risk faced by the farmer reduces his optimal level of 
the choice variable so that a risk-reducing policy can mitigate the choice variable-depressing 
impacts of risk, (iii) support-adjusted profit increases with risk and, (iv) the decoupled payment 
reduces the risk faced by the farmer, the optimal choice of the farmer increases as the magnitude 
of support increases. The decoupled programs reduce the coefficient of absolute risk aversion by 
increasing expected profit (wealth effect) as well as reduce the degree of risk faced by farmers by 
reducing the variability of profit (insurance effect). The author also shows that under constant 
absolute risk aversion, wealth effects are absent and the optimal choice is only influenced by 
insurance effects due to the reduced income variability induced by the increase in government 
supports. A decoupled program must be invariant to the source of uncertainty for the insurance 
effect to be absent and in this case government support will induce a pure wealth effect. Thus, 
income support policies that are assumed to be decoupled are not, in fact, decoupled and may 
affect production decisions. Moreover, in order to obtain some measure of the magnitudes of the 
wealth and insurance effects of a target price program based on fixed yield (i.e. a decoupled 
structure), Hennessy conducts empirical simulation for a 400-acre corn farm in Iowa. The results 
indicate that an increase in the magnitude of support programs could increase input use 
(nitrogen) by a maximum of 15 per cent (through both wealth and insurance effects), while the 
increase in production is small with a maximum of 2.75 per cent (through both wealth and 
insurance effects). By controlling for the wealth effect, it seems that the insurance effects are 
much larger than wealth effects. 
Following Hennessy (1998), Sckokai and Moro (2006) examine the impact of the new 10 
 
Mid-Term Review single farm payment of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) on acreage decisions by considering both the insurance and wealth effects of policy 
changes. By assuming that risk arises due to uncertain prices and that farmers display constant 
relative risk aversion preferences, and by adopting nonlinear mean-variance risk preferences, the 
dual expected utility function is specified and then output supply, input demand, and land 
allocation equations are derived (using Hotelling Lemma) as a function of initial wealth, 
expected output prices, input prices, variance-covariance of prices, and crop-specific area 
payments, among other variables. The authors use farm level data from the Italian Farm 
Accounting Data Network to empirically estimate a ten equation system of output supply (corn, 
durum wheat, other cereals, oilseeds), input demand (seeds and chemicals, and other inputs), and 
land allocation (land to corn, land to durum wheat, land to other cereals, land to oilseeds) over 
1993-1999
1. As both expected cereal prices and the corresponding elements of the variance-
covariance matrix are influenced by the existence of the guaranteed minimum prices for cereals 
during the period of 1993-1999, the price distribution at the minimum price level is truncated. 
The null hypothesis that all variance and covariance coefficients are jointly equal to zero 
is rejected which implies a rejection of risk neutrality. The parameters estimated over the 1993-
1999 period are then used to simulate the effects of the combination of the Agenda 2000 and the 
2003 Mid-Term Review (MTR) reforms, through a scenario with a decrease in cereal 
intervention prices partially compensated by an increase in cereal area payments, which have 
been transformed, together with oilseed payments, into a single farm payment (SFP). Under this 
                                                       
1Since many farms in the sample do not produce some of the crops, the problem of corner solutions for some 
outputs exists. The fraction of farms not producing ranges from a minimum of 41 per cent to a maximum of 62 per 
cent for the five outputs. To deal with corner solutions, the authors use the two-step estimation procedure. In the first 
step, the five probit models (one for each output) are estimated using the level of some quasi-fixed inputs (capital, 
family labour, and land) and two sets of dummy variables representing geographical location (North, Center, and 
South) and altitude (mountains, hills, and plains) as explanatory variables. In the second step, the first-stage probit 
estimates of the corresponding parameters are used in a new form of a system of ten simultaneous equations. 11 
 
scenario, the insurance effect has been derived by shocking the model with the change in 
income/wealth variability only, the relative price/payment effect by shocking the model with the 
changes in prices and payments only, and the wealth effect by shocking the model with the 
change in wealth (resulting from the discounted value of future payments guaranteed by the 
MTR reform, SFP) only. The simulation results show that the introduction of the non-stochastic 
SFP reduces income variability and offsets the impact of the increased price variability due to 
reduction in the intervention price. While the size of the wealth effect is positive but quite small, 
the insurance effect may generate up to a 7 per cent increase in acreage, which implies that the 
size and direction of acreage are strongly influenced by the impact of CAP reforms on farm 
income/wealth variability. 
Coyle, Wei and Rude (2008) study the hypothetical impacts of the Canadian Agricultural 
Income Stabilization (CAIS) program on crop production under risk aversion and price 
uncertainty for wheat, barley, canola and other crops (oats, rye, flax) in Manitoba over 1966-
2002 (which is prior to CAIS implementation). First, an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) 
crop yield model is specified as a function of expected price and price variance
2, initial wealth, 
mean and variance of weather, and the covariance between government payments and crop 
market prices (to capture an insurance effect of government payments). Note that since the 
production homogeneity condition implied by constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) states that 
output supply is homogeneous of degree zero in expected output price, input price, price 
variances, and initial wealth, all monetary variables normalized by an input price index and 
variance-covariance elements are normalized by squared price. Then, a static econometric model 
of Manitoba crop acreage (share) demands conditional on yields is also estimated as a function 
                                                       
2By assuming disjoint technologies (and similar capital/acreage ratios across crops), crop yield can be modelled 
independently of cross price effects.  12 
 
of expected revenues and variance-covariance in revenues
3 per acre for own and competing 
crops, initial wealth, weather variance, and variable input price indexes. Long run impacts on 
output are the sum of long run impacts on yields plus long run impacts on acres. 
The authors develop a simple analytical model of crop production response to CAIS over 
1966-2002. It is shown that under CAIS effective prices of outputs and inputs decline because an 
increase in output and, hence, income implies a reduction in government share of payments. 
Impacts of CAIS on the normalization (Expected price/ i w , input price/ i w , Variance of price/
2
i w , 
Wealth/ i w ), where i w is an input price index, consistent with constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) are calculated. It is calculated that CAIS leads to seven percent increases in relative 
expected effective prices. CAIS leads to the substantial change in effective prices relative to 
nominal wealth which implies a substantial increase in relative wealth (Wealth/ i w ) by 33 
percent. Moreover, under CAIS relative price uncertainty is calculated to increase by 14 percent. 
Using estimated elasticities of the econometric models, calculations show that under CRRA 
assumption, annual crop production increases by six per cent for wheat, nine per cent for barley, 
and decreases by one per cent for canola for a hypothetical implementation of CAIS over 1966-
2002
4. 
I general, the literature clearly shows that support policies that are decoupled in a 
deterministic world can affect the decisions of the risk averse producers when there is 
uncertainty. In the next section, we  provide a detailed theoretical framework that is able to 
                                                       
3By assuming that only prices are stochastic, an adaptive expectation scheme is used to calculate expected prices and 
variance-covariance elements.  
4The authors consider the standard program of Gross Revenue Insurance program (GRIP) as a benchmark for the 
CAIS. After calculating the percentage change in farm level crop output prices due to GRIP (indemnities minus 
farmer premiums) relative to market prices, and correlations of total indemnities with a Divisia index of market 
prices for all crops, the econometric models is used to simulate the impacts of the price support and insurance effects 
of GRIP on output. By comparing the effects of GRIP and CAIS, for wheat and barley, CAIS impacts on long run 
yields arising from increases in relative effective prices and increases in normalized wealth are less substantial than 
the simulated impacts for the historical GRIP, which provided large and transparent subsidies to crop prices.  13 
 
capture the impact of supposedly decoupled support programs on acreage decisions through 
wealth and insurance effects.     
 
3  The Theoretical Model 
 
3.1  The Model 
 
 In this section, we modify Chavas and Holt’s (1990) expected utility model for acreage 
decisions. Consider a farm household producing n crops, agricultural revenue is given by  
  i i i
n
i
A y p R ∑
1 =
=  (1) 
 where  i p  is the market price of the ith crop,  i A  is the number of acres devoted to the ith crop 
and  i y  is the corresponding yield per acre,  n i 1,..., = . The total cost of agricultural production is  
  i i
n
i
A c C ∑
1 =
=  (2) 
 where  i c  shows the cost of production per acre of the ith crop. In the present case, revenue (R ) 
is a risky variable because output prices  ) ,..., ( = 1 n p p p  and crop yields  ) ,..., ( = 1 n y y y  are not 
observed by the household when production decisions are made. Input prices and per acre costs 
( i c ), however, are known at the time crop acreages are allocated. 
The household faces the budget constraint  







1 = 1 = ∑ ∑ − + − +  (3) 
 where  I  denotes exogenous income (initial wealth) and G is an index of household 
consumption of goods purchased with corresponding consumer price index q,  qG  presents 
household consumption expenditures. The above equation states that initial wealth (I ) plus farm 14 
 
profit ( C R− ), which can be called total wealth ( W = C R I − + ), is equal to consumption 
expenditures (qG ). The constraint on acreage decisions (or adding-up constraint) can be 
represented by  
  0 = ) (A f  (4) 
 where  ) ,..., ( = 1 n A A A . 
Assume that the farm household preferences are represented by a von Neumann- 
Morgenstem (v.N-M) utility function  ) (W U
5 satisfying  0 > W U . If the farm household 
maximizes expected utility of normalized total wealth under competition, then the decision 
model is  
  0 = ) ( W = . .
)] ( [
1 = 1 =
A f and A c A y p I t s






i ∑ ∑ − +  (5) 
 where  E  is the expectation operator over the random variables. After substituting the budget 
constraint into the utility function, the maximization problem is expressed as  
 
0 = ) ( . . )] ( [
0, = ) ( . . )] ) / / ( / ( [
1 =
1 =
A f t s A w U E Max












 where  ) / ( = q I w  is normalized initial wealth and  ) / ( ) / ( = q c y q p i i i i − π  denotes normalized profit 
per acre of the ith crop, and all prices are deflated by the consumer price q. 
In this setting, the acreage decision,  A, is made under both price and production 
uncertainty. Both yields  y  and output prices  p  are random variables with given subjective 
probability distributions. Consequently, the expectation E  is over the uncertain variables  p  and 
                                                       
5Note that normalized total wealth is equal to q W / W = , where W is total wealth before normalization.  15 
 
y  and is based on the information available to the household at planting time. 
If 
* A  denotes the optimal acreage choice in optimization equation (6), then the 
Lagrange's equation will be  )) ( ( )] ' ( [ = A f A w U E L μ + Π +  where  0 > μ  and the first-order 




∂ 6 is written as
7  
  0 = ] [ A W f U E μ + Π  (7) 
 where  ) ,..., ( = 1 n π π Π  is assumed to be a random variable with mean Π  and variance-
covariance matrix σ , ) ,..., ( = ' 1 ′ n A A A  and  A f f A ∂ ∂ / =  is a ( n × 1 ) of vector. We follow Newbery 
and Stiglitz (1979) and expand  W U  around expected wealth W ,  ' = ' Π + A w W . First-order 
Taylor series expansion about mean profit yields  WW W W U A U U ) ' ( Π − Π′ + ≅ , where  W U  and 
WW U  are the first and second-order derivatives of the utility function evaluated at the expected 




  0 = A WW W f A U U μ σ + + Π  (8) 
                                                       







7The second-order condition for the objective function to be maximized is:  
  0, < ] ) ( [
2
AA WW f U E μ + Π  
since  0 > μ , this requires that  0 < WW U  and  0 < AA f .  0 < WW U  implies to the concavity of utility function, 
and the concavity of the v.N-M utility function provides the fundamental feature of risk aversion. 
8From (7),  
  ] ) ) ' ( [( ] [ Π Π − Π′ + ≅ Π WW W W U A U E U E  
then,  
  ] )) ( ( ) ( [ ] [ ] [
2 2 Π − Π + Π ≅ Π E E A U E U U E WW W W  
then,  
  , ] [ σ A U U U E WW W W + Π ≅ Π  
note that σ  is crop profit variance-covariance matrix with order  n n× . 16 
 
Therefore, optimal acreage choice in (6) depends on normalized initial wealth w, 
expected normalized crop profits per acre  )] / ( ) / [( = q c y q p E i i i i − π , as well as second moment. In 
other words, the optimal acreage decision can be written as  ) ; ; (
* σ Π w A , where 
) ,..., ( = 1 n π π Π and σ  is crop profit variance-covariance matrix. 
 
3.2  Properties of the Optimal Acreage Decision 
 
In this section we focus on the theoretical restrictions implied by (6) which can modify 
the empirical specification of the acreage decision  ) ; ; (
* σ Π w A . Through theoretical restriction 
channel, we contribute to the literature by incorporating the insurance effect (income 
stabilization)  emphasized in the literature, while ignored by Chavas and Holt model (1990), into 
our theoretical model. In fact, based on the theoretical discussions regarding the role of insurance 
effect in acreage decisions, we extend the theoretical restrictions examined by Chavas and Holt 
(1990), which enables us to include this effect in our model specification. 
First, by considering the relationship between the wealth compensated and 
uncompensated acreage decision functions, Chavas and Holt (1990) have shown that the acreage 
decision is affected by expected total wealth (wealth effect). However, the theoretical framework 
provided by Hennessy (1998)  suggests a  role for an insurance effect in acreage decisions. 
Hence, we should also consider the relationship between income stabilization compensated and 
uncompensated acreage decision functions. Based on this modification, we will have a 
specification different from the one by Chavas and Holt (1990), i.e. acreage response would be a 
function of variance of total profit in addition to the expected total wealth, expected individual 
crop profits and the variance-covariance of individual crop profits. The procedure that shows 
total wealth and its variance should be included in the model is as follows. 17 
 
Consider the compensation function, C, defined implicitly as follows  
  } = )] ' ( [ max = ,.) ( {
0
0 = ) ( . .
U A C w U E C w V
A f t s
Π + + +  
where V  denotes the indirect objective function and C is the certain amount of money that must 
be given to (or paid by, if negative) the decision maker in order to keep him at a particular level 
of utility 
0 U . The compensation function as defined in the above is a function of w, Π , σ  and 
0 U . The relationships between the uncompensated choice function 
* A  and the compensated 
function 
c A  are defined as 
 
  ) , ), , , , ( ( = ) , , , (
0 * 0 σ σ σ Π Π + Π U w C w A U w A
c  
The above expression indicates how the compensation, C, influences optimal choices. By 
differentiating with respect to Π  and σ
9, we have 
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 (9) 
Since Levy and Markowitz (1979) have demonstrated that the mean-variance model is 
appropriate as a second-order Taylor series approximation to all risk-averse utility functions, in 








, for simplicity we can consider the expected utility in the 
above as  W W U τσ
2
1
= −  where W  is expected total wealth, τ  shows the non-constatnt 
coefficient of risk aversion, i.e.  ) , ( W W σ τ , and  W σ  is the variance of wealth. We define 
                                                       
9Note that Chavas and Holt (1990) consider only the differentiation with respect to Π  and do not consider another 
element σ  in the choice functions. 18 
 
' = A w W
o Π + , where expected total wealth before compensation 
o W  is initial wealth w plus 
expected income from the market,  ' A Π , and  ' A A
o
T σ σ = , where 
o
T σ   is the variance of total 
wealth before compensation. If  W
o C W W + =  and σ σ σ C
o
T T − =  are total wealth and variance 
after compensation and  σ C C C W + = , we can write  C A A A w U + − Π + '
2
1
' = σ τ . Using the 






































































































































































































A A A A A
A A A A A
A A A A A
L















c c A A












































































=  by 
































 in expression (10) is symmetric, positive 





















This wealth effect shows the income-supporting attribute of government policies, that is, higher 
average income arising from the support policy may affect producer decisions. These results are 
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′  at  0 = C , therefore 
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, which maintains a given 
                                                       
12Under constant absolute risk aversion, the wealth effect vanishes implying that  Π ∂ ∂ Π ∂ ∂ / = /
* A A
c . In this case, 
compensated and uncompensated choice functions have the same slope with respect to Π  and  Π ∂ ∂ /
* A  is a 
symmetric, positive semidefinite matrix from (10). This illustrates the influence of risk preferences on acreage 
choice functions since nonzero wealth effects reflect nonconstant absolute risk aversion. Also, note from (10) that 
non-negative wealth effects ( 0 /
* ≥ ∂ ∂ W A ) are sufficient conditions to guarantee that an increase in expected 
returns per acre of the ith crop will result in an increase in the optimal acreage of that crop i.e.,  0 /
* ≥ ∂ ∂ i i A π .  21 
 










, emphasized in the literature (Hennessy, 
1998) but ignored by Chavas and Holt (1990). This insurance effect shows the income-
stabilizing attribute of government policies; that is, programs may affect optimal decisions by 
reducing the variance of the farm crop portfolio directly. 
Second, another theoretical restriction is a homogeneity condition which has been derived 
by Chavas and Pope (1985) in the context of the expected utility model (6). In particular, 
rewriting expression (4) as  0 = ) ( = ) ( . 1 A g A A f − , where  ) , ( = . 1 A A A , Chavas and Pope have 
shown that the following restriction holds at the optimum under any risk preferences  























  Consider the first-order conditions (7), we have  μ ]/ [ = Π W A U E f  and we know that 
) ( ) ( ) , ( = ] [ Π + Π Π E U E U Cov U E W W W . Given  0 ≠ μ , substituting these conditions into (12) 
yields  












 where  ) ( )/ , ( = W W U E U Cov Π ϕ  is an ( 1 × n ) vector. 
Under risk neutrality,  0 = /
* w A ∂ ∂  and  0 = ϕ , implying from (13) that the acreage 
decision function 
* A  is homogenous of degree zero in  j π  (or in output and input prices,  p  and 









∂ ∑ . This homogeneity restriction of classical production theory states that 
production decisions are not affected by proportional changes in all input and output prices. 
However, under risk aversion,  0 ≠ ϕ  and (13) implies that this homogeneity-like restriction takes 22 
 
a different form. In other words, in general under uncertainty the classical result of riskless 
production theory, which asserts that production decisions depend only on input-output price 
ratios, does not hold. Pope (1988) has presented some empirical implications of specific forms of 
risk preferences. In particular, under constant relative risk aversion
13, a positive scaling of wealth 
does not alter optimal decisions (Sandmo, 1971)
14. This implies that decision functions are 
almost homogenous of degree one in initial wealth, degree one in mean returns Π , degree two in 
moments of order two, and degree s in moments of order s of π  (See Pope, 1988 for details).  
 
3.3  Model Specification  
 
 As explained in section 3.1, the optimal acreage decision can be written as  ) , , (
* σ Π w A . 
Note that the government payments’ influence on the subjective probability distribution of 
profits is modeled by by truncating the distribution. The resulting truncation of the subjective 
probability distribution of profits will affect expected profits, Π , as well as the second moment 
of the profit distribution σ . Thus, we incorporate government programs into the acreage 
decision model using a truncation method (see Appendix C for details). 
 Using the first-order Taylor series expansion, the acreage equations can be specified as  
                                                       
13The coefficient of relative risk aversion is defined as  
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−  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  
  
 
14According to Pope (1988), a function  ) ,..., ( 1 N Z Z h ,  R R h
N → :  is said to be almost homogenous of degree 





N C C Z Z h Z Z h λ λ λ  where 














t i it A A w w A a A υ σ σ π π + ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ + ∑ ∑ ∑
≥
− ) / ( ) / ( ) / ( =
1 = 1 =
1 0  (14) 
 where 
T π  is the truncated mean of crop profits and 
T σ  shows the truncated variance-
covariance of crop profits. Using (10) and (11), it follows that equation (14) can be expressed 
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 Note that  T σ  denotes the variance of total (farm) profit and 
T σ  shows the truncated variance of 
crop profit. Letting  j
c
i ij A π β ∂ ∂ / =  and  jk
c
i ijk A σ γ ∂ ∂ / =  be the compensated slopes with respect to 
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1 = 1 = 1 = 1 =
1 0  (16) 
 where  W Ai i ∂ ∂ / = α




j A π ∑ 1 =  is equal to the 






j k A A σ ∑ ∑ ≥ 1 =  is equal to the truncated variance of total (farm) profit (i.e. the insurance 
effect). In the absence of a priori information about functional form, equation (16) provides a 
local approximation to the decision function  (.)
* A . Also, the symmetry of (10) implies that 
ji ij β β = ,  j i ≠ . Equation (16) can be used directly for an empirical analysis of acreage 
decisions. 
                                                       
15 Note that  w Ai ∂ ∂ / =  w W W Ai ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ / . / and since  1 / = ∂ ∂ w W (because ' A w W Π + =  ), therefore 
W A w A i i ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ / / . 24 
 
Regrading the expected sign of the variables in equation (16), it is shown that the 
expected own-profit and its variance should have positive and negative impacts on acreage in 
each equation, respectively. The effect of expected cross-profits and other elements of the 
covariance matrix on acreage decisions are not known  a priori (See Appendix D for details). 
Although it is presumed that the expected total wealth (wealth effect) and its variance (insurance 
effect) have positive and negative impacts on acreage allocations with no constraint on total 
acreage, the sign of these variables are not clear a priori when the total acreage is assumed to be 
fixed. In this case, the different signs across equations suggest that producers will shift from less 
risky crops to more risky crops as a result of the wealth and insurance effects.  
In sum, the  theoretical framework shows that acreage allocated to each crop can be 
specified as a function of  the expected profits from each individual crop, elements of the profit 
variance-covariance matrix, as well as expected total wealth and its variance. The latters capture 
the wealth and insurance effects of support programs. In the next section, we apply our 
theoretical model to measure the effect of government crop programs on acreage decisions for 
major farm crops in the prairie provinces of Canada.  
 
 
4  The Empirical Framework 
 
The empirical estimation in this paper  utilizes provincial-level data to determine supply 
responses for spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley, rye, peas, flax, canola, and hay in the 
prairie provinces of Canada. Farmers’ acreage decisions are estimated by pooling time-series 
(1971-2006) with cross section (individual provinces, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta) 
data. Two specifications of the acreage response model are examined in this study: acreage level 
model and acreage share model. The share equations are specified to explain how the shares of 25 
 
total cropland allocated to specific crops respond to the expected profits, profit risks, total 
wealth, and other exogenous variables. The specification explicitly recognizes that as the share 
of the combined cropland planted to one commodity (say wheat) increases, the expanded wheat 
acreage has to come from cropland planted to competing crops, such as barley, canola, or other 
field crops. In other words, the sum of the acreage shares equals one (total cropland planted to all 
field crops is assumed to be fixed). The empirical model treats all equations as a system of 
acreage allocation decisions under risk. The linear acreage and acreage-share models (with 
acreage share ( i S ) of the crops in each province as the dependent variable) have the following 
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 (30) 
 where  i A  is the acreage planted to the ith crop (1 = spring wheat, 2 = durum wheat, 3 = oats, 4= 
barley, 5= rye, 6= peas, 7= flax, 8= canola, and 9= hay; in acres),  i S  is the share of combined 
acreage of spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley, rye, peas, flax, canola, hay planted to the ith 
crop (1 = spring wheat, 2 = durum wheat, 3 = oats, 4= barley, 5= rye, 6= peas, 7= flax, 8= 
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j k A A σ ∑ ∑ ≥ 1 =  is equal to the truncated 26 
 
variance of total (farm) profit ($), 
T
j π  is the truncated expected profits ($/acre) for jth 
commodity, 
T
jk σ  is the truncated expected variance-covariance of profits ($/acre) between jth and 
kth commodities,  l ϕ  is provincial dummies ( 1,2,3 = l ) or fixed effects to control for persistent 
provincial factors.  1 − it A  (or  1 − it S ) is a lagged dependent variable for ith commodity and has been 
included to account for inertia, which is attributable to the cost of adjustment associated with 
switching from one crop to another
16, and  i υ  is the error term. 
 
4.1  Data Description 
 
Assuming that aggregate behavior can be approximated by a representative farm 
household making decisions according to the theoretical model described, we propose to 
estimate the linear acreage equations (29) and acreage share equations (30) from aggregate data. 
The acreage variables  9 2 1 , , , A A A K  (1= spring wheat, 2= durum wheat, 3= oats, 4= 
barley, 5= rye 6= peas, 7= flax, 8= canola, 9=tame hay) measure acreage planted to each crop (in 
acres) and were obtained from CANSIM table 001-0010 which provides time series data on 
seeded area by crops at the provincial level. Yields  9 2 1 , , , y y y K  (tonne/acre) were also obtained 
from CANSIM table 001-0010. The market prices ( 9 2 1 , , , p p p K ) are average farm prices 
($/tonne) and were obtained from the Manitoba Agriculture Yearbook (various years), Manitoba 
Agriculture, Food and Rural Initiatives; the Agriculture Statistics Yearbook (various years), 
Alberta Agriculture and Rural Development; and Agricultural Statistics (various years), 
Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization
17. 
                                                       
16This could, to some degree, also reflect the effect of change in crop rotation practices on a specific rotation crop. 
17Data on durum wheat prices were not available in Manitoba and Alberta. As an alternative, we calculated the 
durum wheat to spring wheat price ratio in Saskatchewan. Then, we constructed durum wheat prices based on the 27 
 
Initial wealth is defined as the sum of value of capital stock in crop production 
(machinery and equipment plus land and buildings) minus related debts. Data on value of 
machinery and equipment and value of land and buildings from CANSIM table 002-007 and 
outstanding farm debt from CANSIM table 002-0008 indicates that the value of land and 
buildings greatly exceeds the other two series, and the other two series largely cancel out. For 
example, in 2006 the value of land and buildings was $ million 10795, 23156 and 45968, the 
value of machinery and equipment was  $ million 3594, 8129 and 9059 and total debt was $ 
million 5805, 7024 and 10996 in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, respectively. Therefore, 
initial wealth (in $) is constructed as the value of land and buildings in crop agriculture. This is 
calculated from total crop acres (CANSIM table 001-0010) multiply by the value per acre of 
farmland and buildings from CANSIM table 002-003 in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta 
for different years. 
In Manitoba, all items of costs of crop production
18, in detail, for different crops 
9 2 1 , , , c c c K  ($/acre) were obtained in a request from Manitoba Agriculture, Food and Rural 
Initiatives, Policy Analysis Branch, Crop Production Costs Guidelines (various publications) for 
years 1982-2006. For years prior to 1982, we calculated the farm input price index
19 in each year 
relative to the 1982 farm input price index ratio. Crop costs were constructed based on the 
multiplication of this ratio by crop costs in 1982. In Saskatchewan, detailed crop costs were 
obtained in a request from Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization, 
                                                                                                                                                                               
multiplication of this ratio by spring wheat prices in Manitoba and Alberta. 
18It should be noted that we subtracted non-allowable costs like rent (land, building and machinery), building/ 
machinery repairs, and property tax from the respective calculated costs.  
19The farm input price indices (index, 1986=100) were obtained from CANSIM table 328-0001. This table provides 
a price index for all components of farm inputs at the provincial level for different years. 28 
 
Agriculture, Business and Development Branch, Crop Planning Guide (various publications)
20, 
for years 1985-2006
21. We used the same procedure as we did for Manitoba when  constructing 
the crop costs in missing years. In Alberta, detailed crop costs were obtained in a request from 
Alberta Agriculture and Rural Development, Crops Economics Units for years 1985-2006. For 
years prior to 1985, crop costs were constructed based on the same method as we used for 
Manitoba. 
To measure yield expectations, actual yields are regressed on a trend variable. The 
resulting predictions are taken as expected yield as well as from the adaptive expectation 
procedure provided in equation (33). For expected farm price, an adaptive expectation scheme 
built from lagged farm prices as shown in equation (32) was used, but in addition the empirical 
model in this study is forward-looking in that farmers are also assumed to base their expectations 
on futures prices. 
The planting-time crop futures price forecast was taken as the price of December crop 
futures at planting time from 1982 to 2006
22. In the cases of spring wheat, oats, barley, flax and 
canola, the futures price were the price of December crop futures on or about April 30th
23, and 
are collected from the Canadian grain Industry Statistical Handbook (various issues) and the 
Winnipeg Commodity Exchange, Statistical Annual (various issues). Since there was no future 
market for durum wheat, rye, peas and hay, the expected price for these crops were constructed 
                                                       
20Crop production costs are reported in different soil zones, black, brown, and dark brown. Since the crop cost data 
in other provinces were available in only for the black soil zone, we used the black soil zone crop costs in 
Saskatchewan. 
21Tame hay production costs were not available in Crop Planning Guide. We obtained hay production cost in 2006 
from the publication Dryland Forage Production Costs, Fact Sheet Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, October 
2007. Then, we calculated Saskatchewan hay cost to Manitoba hay cost ratio in 2006. We constructed a time series 
of Saskatchewan hay production costs based on the multiplication of this ratio by hay production cost in Manitoba 
for different years. 
22There was no data available on future prices for all crops before 1982. 
23Note that when data for December futures price were not available, we have used the November or October 
futures price. 29 
 
based on the futures price of the commodity that have the highest correlation with these crops
24. 
To allow for price differentials across provinces, the futures prices were proportionally adjusted 
by provincial farm prices
25. 
By assuming that both price ( i p ) and yield per acre ( i y ) are random variables (to reflect 
not only price risk, but also production risk facing producers) and costs of production for the ith 
crop ( i c ) are constant, we derive the untruncated expected profit for ith crop, the variance of 
profit and the covariance between crop profits in Appendix B. Appendix C provides the 
truncated mean, variance and covariance. Since truncation requires a  guaranteed point, we 
explain our method of  data construction for guaranteed profit by crop-specific and whole-farm 
programs in what follows (See Appendix A for a brief history of Canadian agricultural 





Guaranteed Profit by Agricultural Stabilization Act (ASA) 
 
The ASA provided payments to producers in every province during periods of low 
commodity prices. It guaranteed farmers 90 percent of a three-year moving-average price 
(Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis; 2002). Mandatory support was provided for cattle, hogs, lambs and 
wool; industrial milk and industrial cream; corn and soybeans; and spring wheat, winter wheat, 
                                                       
24For example, hay farm prices were regressed on future prices of spring wheat, oats, barley, flax and canola. The 
highest explanatory power was obtained from barley futures price, which had an R-squared equal to 0.80. Next, we 
constructed hay futures price by multiplying hay farm price by the ratio of barley futures price over its farm price. 
For the case of durum wheat, peas and rye, the highest explanatory power was obtained from spring wheat, canola 
and spring wheat with R-squared 0.98, 0.70 and 0.98, respectively. 
25In each province, we calculated the difference between obtained futures price from the Winnipeg Commodity 
Exchange and farm prices and then the province that had the least difference in average (the base province), has 
been given the collected futures prices. Next, we constructed futures prices for the other provinces by multiplying 
the farm prices in the province by the ratio of futures prices over farm prices in the base province. 30 
 
oats and barley (Statistics Canada, 2007). Among the crops in our study, we calculated the 
support price in each year (from 1970 to 1984) for spring wheat, oats and barley based on the 
previous three-year average prices ($/tonne). We constructed the guaranteed (gross) profit based 
on the multiplication of each year’s yield (tonne/acre) by 90 percent of support price for spring 
wheat, oats and barley in each province over 1970-1984. Then, we obtained the guaranteed profit 
($/acre) by subtracting the crop production costs from guaranteed gross profit. 
 
Guaranteed Profit by Crop Insurance  
 
The payment mechanism in a Crop Insurance program is based on individual yield 
coverage which means that a producer can get yield insurance up to a proportion, usually 70 
percent or 80 percent, of his or her own ten-year average yield (Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis; 
2002). It should be noted that all crop insurance contracts guarantee a price. In each year, we 
calculated yield guarantee (tonne/acre) as the previous ten-year average yield ( y ) for each crop 
in each province multiplied by 0.7. Price coverage ($/tonne) for each crop has been obtained by 
request from Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation (SCIC); Manitoba Crop Insurance 
Corporation (MCIC); and Agriculture Financial Services Corporation (AFSC), Alberta; for the 
years 1970-2006. We constructed the guaranteed (gross) profit based on the multiplication of 
yield guarantee by price coverage for each crop in each province over 1970-2006. Then, we 
obtained the guaranteed profit ($/acre) by subtracting the crop production costs from guaranteed 
gross profit. 
 
Guaranteed Profit by the Gross Revenue Insurance Program (GRIP) 
 
In GRIP, farmers were guaranteed a per-acre return on whatever crop they grew. The 
program guaranteed producers their long-term average yield. The guaranteed price was set by an 31 
 
indexed moving average price (Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis; 2002). In each year (from 1991 to 
1995), we calculated the previous fifteen-year average yield (tonne/acre) for each crop in each 
province as the long-term average yield. Price coverage ($/tonne) for each crop has been 
obtained by request from SCIC, MCIC, and AFSC for the years 1991-1995.We constructed the 
guaranteed profit ($/acre) based on the multiplication of the long-term average yield by price 





Guaranteed Profit by the Western Grain Stabilization Act (WGSA) 
 
In WGSA
26, payments are based on producers’ eligible grain sales. Payment made when 
aggregate net cash flow (cash receipts minus cash variable costs) from eligible grain (wheat, 
oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, canola and mustard seed; from 1988 nine crops are added to the seven 
previously covered − triticale, mixed grains, sunflower, safflower, buckwheat, peas, lentils, 
fababeans, canary seed) sales was less than the average net cash flow over the previous five 
years (Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis; 2002). We derived a net cash flow ($) for 1978-1979 and 
1984-1991 as total crop receipts ( i i i i A y p ∑
8
1 = ) minus total crop production allowable
27 costs 
( i i i A c ∑
8
1 = ) in each province. We calculated a previous five-year average net cash flow. The 
eligible net cash flow in each province was constructed based on the multiplication of the 
previous five-year average net cash flow by the eligibility ratio
28, which reduces net cash receipts 
                                                       
26 WGSA was a crop-specific program. But since it covers all crops in our study, we categorized it into whole-farm 
programs. 
27We have subtracted property tax, rent, machinery and building repairs, custom work, and stabilization premiums 
from total crop production costs. 
28 Statistics Canada, percentage distribution of farms by total gross farm receipts class, Census of Agriculture 32 
 
for those receipts that are not eligible (corporations and production in excess of individual farm 
limits - $60,000 total receipts per farm). In each province, we used this eligible net cash flow as 
the guaranteed total profit ($) by WGSA for 1978-1979 and 1984-1991. 
 
Guaranteed Profit by the Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA) 
 
NISA pay-outs were made when the farmer's net income fell below 70 percent of the 
previous three-year average (Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis; 2002). We derived net farm income ($) 
for 1991-2002 as total crop receipts ( i i i i A y p ∑
8
1 = ) minus total crop production allowable costs 
( i i i A c ∑
8
1 = ) in each province. We calculated previous three-year average net cash flow. In each 
province, we used 70 percent of this net farm income as the total profit ($) guaranteed by NISA 
over 1991-2002. 
 
Guaranteed Profit by Agricultural Income Disaster Assistance (AIDA)/Canadian 
Farm Income Plan (CFIP) 
 
In AIDA/CFIP, when producers’ net income fell below 70 percent of their three-year, 
moving average net income they become eligible for a pay-out (Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis; 
2002). So we used the same procedure as NISA for constructing the guaranteed total profit ($) 
over 1998-2002. 
 
Guaranteed Profit by the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) 
 
Payments are made when the program year margin falls below the reference year margin. 




and lowest years dropped (CAIS handbook, AAFC). We derived net margin ($) for 2003-2006 as 
total crop allowable receipts ( i i i i A y p ∑
8
1 = ) minus total crop production allowable costs ( i i i A c ∑
8
1 = ) 
in each province
29. In each year, we dropped the highest and lowest previous five-year margins 
and then calculated a three-year average margin as the total profit ($) guaranteed by CAIS in 
each province over 2003-2006. 
 
4.2  Estimation and Results 
 
As indicated earlier, the acreage response model examines farmers’ planting decisions for 
spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley, rye, peas, flax, canola, hay and summerfallow in three 
prairie provinces. To have the most consistent estimation results, we estimate the model with 
different specifications and different data sets using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). We 
specify the acreage equations in both acres level and share (equations 29 and 30). Moreover, 
each of these equations is estimated using two sets of data: one contains adaptive expectations 
for the expected prices and yields, the other one uses the future prices as the expected prices and 
trend yield as the expected yield. Then, among the different estimations, we choose the model 
where its results are more consistent with theoretical expectations and which has a higher  R-
square or lower  MSE (Mean Square Error). 
To have reliable and theoretically consistent estimations, three restrictions are imposed 
(these restrictions are the same as what apply to the AIDS demand system across expenditure 
share equations) that are implied by the theory. As inferred by expression (10), symmetry 
restrictions require that individual crop cross-profit regression coefficients across the acreage 
equations be equal; that is, 
                                                       
29To be allowable, income and expenses must be directly related to the primary production of agricultural 
commodities. The CAIS Handbook provides some examples of allowable and non-allowable income and expense 
items. For instance, crop insurance proceeds are considered as allowable income. 34 
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thirty-six constraints. As discussed in the theoretical framework, the acreage decision functions 
are almost homogenous of degree one in initial wealth, degree one in mean returns, and degree 
two in moments of order two. This means that if expected wealth and expected crop profits are 
multiplied by λ  and elements of the variance –covariance matrix and variance of total wealth are 
multiplied by 
2 λ , the acreage decisions would not change. If the acreage equations are estimated 
in logarithm form, we can impose the homogeneity restriction on coefficients in each equation 
(sum of the total wealth and individual crop profits coefficients plus the crop variance-
covariance and the variance of total wealth coefficients is equal to zero). However, we are not 
able to estimate equations in logarithm form because the covariance variables may be negative in 
the observations. Therefore, we are only able to test for the homogeneity restriction using the 
estimated coefficients and the mean of the variables. To maintain adding-up restrictions (the sum 
of the shares for these ten category crops equals one or total cropland is assumed to be fixed over 
time), we drop one crop acreage equation, summerfallow
30. In fact, the share (acre level) for 
summerfallow is treated as a residual, which is not directly estimated to avoid singularity in the 
disturbance covariance matrix. 
The estimation of aggregate acreage response equations involves the use of cross section 
(three provinces) data. Hence, it is important to control for persistent provincial economic 
(dis)advantages, including institutional differences and economic conditions. To solve this 
problem, fixed effects of individual provinces are used in the model, thus we can be more 
confident that our independent variables coefficients reflect their marginal impacts rather than 
                                                       
30Theoretically, this can be done when all regressors are identical across equations. Considering that summerfallow 
acreage is affected by the same factors as other crops (Clark and Klein), this condition holds in our system. 
    35 
 
long-term structural effects related to economic endowments. 
After estimation of the four potential models (each of the acreage level and share 
equations with the adaptive expectations and the futures price-trend yield)
31, results from the 
acreage level model based on the futures price-trend yield are regarded as the base model due to 
their consistency with theoretical expectations, more statistically significant coefficients and 
lower mean square errors
32. According to the results of the base model, we should not worry 
about the heteroskedasticity problem that potentially arises from the use of cross section data. 
The system of acreage equations is estimated by seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), which 
estimates the equations initially by least square and then incorporates the estimated variance and 
covariance matrix of residuals in the estimation of generalized least square (GLS). Moreover, we 
have conducted a heteroskedasticity test in individual equations. According to the Breusch-Pagan 
test, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is not rejected for all crops except peas. P-values of 
computed Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistics in spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley, rye, 
flax, canola, and hay equations are 0.5136, 0.4426, 0.5316, 0.3189, 0.6877, 0.1468, 0.9095, and 
0.1427, respectively. Hence, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity cannot be rejected. In the 
peas equation, the LM test (with p-values 0.0996) is inconclusive,  as it depends on the 
confidence level chosen from chi-squared table. Also, based on the estimated coefficients and 
mean of variables, we did the test for homogeneity condition. The result indicated that in most 
equations (except for spring wheat, peas and rye) homogeneity condition cannot be rejected
33.  
                                                       
31To increase degrees of freedom and avoid the high collinearity between covariance terms, we omitted insignificant 
covariance terms in each equation. Although the adding-up restrictions require that all regressors are identical across 
equations, omitting insignificant covariance terms maybe reasonable considering that there are many regressors that 
suffer from high degree of collinearity. 
32Due to the space limitations, only the results from the base model (acreage level model based on the futures 
prices-trend yield) are presented. 
33P-valus for the null hypothesis of homogeneity condition for the spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley, rye, 
peas, flax, canola and hay equation are 0.02, 0.79, 0.32, 0.35, 0.06, 0.00, 0.30, 0.13, 0.15, respectively. 36 
 
The results of the acreage response model incorporating wealth and insurance effects are 
given in Tables E1 and E2 in Appendix E. The overall fit of the resulting model is good, as 
indicated by the high R-squared. In addition, the signs on the various variables are generally 
consistent with theory. As anticipated, expected own profits in spring wheat, oats, peas, flax, 
canola and hay equations have the expected positive signs and are statistically significant except 
for peas. As Table 1 shows the acreage elasticity with respect to expected own-profit for these 
crops are 0.19, 0.21, 0.007, 0.57, 0.38 and 0.03, respectively. Durum wheat, barley and rye do 
not have the expected signs for expected own profits, but they are insignificant. Although the 
variance of own profit variables have all the expected negative signs (except for rye with positive 
sign but insignificant), few of them for barley, flax and hay are statistically significant. As the 
variance of own profit elasticities in Table 1 show, elasticities are -0.02 for barley, -0.15 for flax 
and -0.04 for hay. 
The results in this study suggest that the effects of risk (variance and covariance 
variables) on acreage response for major crops are not strong but vary across commodities. In the 
spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley, rye, peas, flax, canola, and hay equations approximately 
65, 16, 12, 18, 15, 28, 64, 87, and 30 percent of risk variables respectively are statistically 
significant. In a multi-output framework, one has to judge the impact of risk on output as the 
impact of the variance-covariance matrix as a whole. A Wald test to see if beta coefficients of all 
risk variables in each equation are jointly statistically significant suggests that risk does matter in 
farmers’ spring wheat, oats, rye, peas, flax, canola, and hay planting decisions
34. However, in the 
cases of durum wheat and barley, the p-values are 0.26 for the former and 0.34 for the latter. 
Furthermore, the null hypothesis that beta coefficients of all risk variables in the system of nine 
                                                       
34The null hypothesis that beta coefficients of all risk variables are zero in the spring wheat, oats, rye, peas, flax, 
canola, and hay acreage equations have p-values as follows: 0.00, 0.00, 0.09, 0.03, 0.02, 0.00, and 0.00 respectively. 37 
 
equations are jointly zero is strongly rejected. 
The expected total wealth (initial wealth plus market return) variable is statistically 
significant in spring wheat, rye and barley equations (as can be seen in Table 1, acreage elasticity 
with respect to the expected total wealth are 0.16 in spring wheat, 1.22 in rye and 0.16 in barley). 
However, all beta coefficients of the wealth variable in the system are jointly statistically 
significant with p-values of 0.002. This means that the wealth is one of the factors that 
significantly affects the allocation of acres among different crops. The weighted average of 
wealth variables for individual crops, is estimated to be 0.022
35. A positive overall wealth effect 
is consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) preferences
36. In other words, an 
increase in wealth leads to a decline in profit risk (including both yield and price risks) aversion 
and an increase in the acreage planted to more risky crops (note that the total acreage is 
constant). Regarding the insurance effect, although the insurance variable is only statistically 
significant in spring wheat, canola and peas equations (as illustrated in Table 1, acreage elasticity 
with respect to variance of total profit are -0.10 spring wheat, 0.17 in canola and -0.10 in peas), 
all beta coefficients of the variance of total profit variable in the system are jointly statistically 
significant with p-values of 0.004 which indicates the importance of considering this effect in the 
model. 
The lagged dependent variable was included in the acreage response model as an 
explanatory variable to control for the cost of adjustment in switching from one crop to another. 
Beta coefficients of the lagged dependent variable suggest that producers in the prairie responded 
                                                       
35Weights are the share of each crop acres in total acres during the period of study in three provinces 
36Sandmo (1971) has examined the relationship between wealth effects,  w A ∂ ∂ /
* , and the nature of risk 
preferences. In particular, a zero wealth effect,  0 = /
* w A ∂ ∂ , corresponds to constant absolute risk aversion. In 
contrast,  0 /
* ≠ ∂ ∂ w A  corresponds to nonconstant absolute risk aversion. In the single-product case, Sandmo has 
shown that a positive wealth effect ( 0 > /
* w A ∂ ∂ ) in supply response implies decreasing absolute risk aversion 
which is a maintained hypothesis in much of the economic literature (e.g., Arrow, 1965). 38 
 
to market signals and government programs fairly slowly but differently across the various crops. 
In the case of rye, producers completed their response at a rate of 15 percent within a year, while 














Table1: Estimated Elasticities 






Elasticity  0.199** -0.019  -0.023  0.028  -0.011 0.022 0.005  -0.172**  0.003  -0.017  0.035 
Std. Err.  0.061 0.034 0.015  0.028 0.007  0.018 0.023  0.046 0.010  0.021  0.028 
dwh acre 
Elasticity  -0.073 -0.048 -0.055  0.123  -0.013 0.012 -0.022  0.184  0.019  0.037  -0.063 
Std. Err.  0.129 0.144 0.038  0.081 0.020  0.055 0.066  0.128 0.027  0.077  0.096 
oats acre 
Elasticity  -0.161 -0.103 0.211** 0.124*  0.059**  -0.066 0.011  -0.060 -0.019  -0.038  0.007 
Std. Err.  0.109 0.071 0.062  0.077 0.028  0.049 0.073  0.101 0.036  0.039  0.052 
barley acre 
Elasticity  0.060 0.069 0.037* -0.043 -0.008  -0.001 0.001  -0.071 0.023  0.038  -0.010 
Std. Err.  0.060 0.046 0.023  0.058 0.012  0.026 0.034  0.057 0.017  0.026  0.032 
rye acre 
Elasticity  -0.635 -0.209 0.510** -0.231 -0.044  -0.280 -0.385  0.454  0.172  0.031  -0.009 
Std. Err.  0.412 0.317 0.237  0.333 0.206  0.230 0.375  0.415 0.197  0.151  0.187 
peas acre 
Elasticity  0.211 0.030 -0.091 -0.003 -0.045  0.007 0.183* -0.184 -0.072  0.013  0.023 
Std. Err.  0.173 0.141 0.068  0.121 0.037  0.116 0.107  0.185 0.053  0.080  0.096 
flax acre 
Elasticity  0.055 -0.060 0.016  0.005 -0.067  0.196*  0.578** -0.507**  -0.346**  0.081  -0.115 
Std. Err.  0.238 0.184 0.108  0.169 0.065  0.114 0.225  0.244 0.082  0.107  0.134 
canola acre 
Elasticity  -0.248** 0.070  -0.012  -0.048  0.011 -0.027 -0.070** 0.384**  -0.002  0.083  -0.182 
Std. Err.  0.066 0.049 0.021  0.039 0.010  0.027 0.034  0.096 0.015  0.044  0.051 
hay acre 
Elasticity  0.008 0.015 -0.008  0.032 0.009  -0.022  -0.099** -0.005 0.036**  -0.003  -0.037** 
Std. Err.     0.032 0.021 0.015  0.024 0.010  0.016 0.023  0.031 0.018  0.010  0.013 40 
 
 
Table 1: Continued 
   Equation   Var oats   Var barley   Var rye   Var peas   Var flax   Var canola   Var hay  tot exp w  tot St. Err. w  lagged acre 
swh acre 
Elasticity  0.054** -0.008  0.004  -0.033** 0.020  -0.002 -0.012  0.164**  -0.101** 0.549** 
Std. Err.  0.016 0.012 0.019  0.020 0.015  0.021 0.018  0.086  0.035  0.048 
dwh acre 
Elasticity  -0.011 0.004 0.046  -0.071  -0.098**  0.285* -0.050**  -0.328  0.100  0.247* 
Std. Err.  0.062 0.033 0.056  0.062 0.049  0.078 0.053  0.223  0.116  0.099 
oats acre 
Elasticity  -0.052 0.007  0.091**  -0.004 0.006  0.003 -0.048  -0.213  0.095  0.657** 
Std. Err.  0.034 0.024 0.034  0.038 0.028  0.041 0.036  0.162  0.081  0.083 
barley acre 
Elasticity  -0.026 -0.026** -0.009  0.015  0.007  0.002 0.027  -0.160* 0.016  0.403** 
Std. Err.  0.019 0.014 0.025  0.020 0.016  0.024 0.021  0.096  0.034  0.109 
rye acre 
Elasticity  0.061 0.011 0.092  0.033 0.039  0.112 -0.174 1.222**  0.236  0.868** 
Std. Err.  0.123 0.090 0.124  0.151 0.100  0.131 0.142  0.617  0.204  0.197 
peas acre 
Elasticity  -0.028 -0.120** -0.043  -0.049  -0.041  0.025 0.119**  -0.824 -0.108**  0.445** 
Std. Err.  0.053 0.047 0.060  0.079 0.047  0.069 0.063  0.556  0.039  0.073 
flax acre 
Elasticity  -0.108 -0.034 0.133*  -0.131  -0.154**  0.225** 0.224** -0.258  -0.010  0.662** 
Std. Err.  0.082 0.061 0.080  0.088 0.075  0.101 0.087  0.385  0.122  0.095 
canola acre 
Elasticity  0.010 0.088 0.029  0.021  -0.104 -0.028 -0.039  0.031  0.172**  0.452** 
Std. Err.  0.030 0.022 0.038  0.039 0.025  0.039 0.032  0.139  0.056  0.058 
hay acre 
Elasticity  -0.013 0.024** -0.007 0.016* -0.008 0.014  -0.048**  0.046  0.029  1.011** 
Std. Err.     0.009 0.007 0.011  0.010 0.008  0.012 0.011  0.043  0.018  0.063 
Notes: * is significant at 10 percent and ** is significant at 5 percent. Coef.=Coefficient; Std. Err.=Standard Error; prof=expected profit; Var=Variance; swh=spring 





The  estimated acreage response results reported above provide a basis for analyzing the 
effects of government direct payments on acreage planted to major field crops in the prairies. In 
this study, the effects of direct payments on acreage decisions are determined by finding the 
difference in total profit distribution parameters without direct payments, and total profit 
distribution parameters with direct payments. Then, using the estimated coefficients for expected 
total wealth and variance of total wealth (profit) we are able to calculate the acreage effects of 
direct payments. Specifically, we want to determine the effects of direct payments during the last 
decade, NISA (1991-2002) and CAIS (2003-2006), on the plantings of major field crops in the 
prairie provinces. 
Table 2 shows values of parameters used in the simulation analysis of the effects of NISA 
for 1991-2002 and CAIS for 2003-2006 on acreage allocation, in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and 
Alberta. Specifically, this table presents the parameters of the total profit distribution with 
(truncated distribution) and without (untruncated distribution) the NISA and CAIS as the whole 
farm programs. For example, the truncation of CAIS on total (farm) profit distribution raises the 
expected farm profit in Saskatchewan to $2,391,969,105 (on average over 2003-2006), up from 
$1,788,496,668 in the absence of CAIS. Meanwhile, the truncation of CAIS lowers the standard 




Table  2:  Parameter used for Simulation (in dollar)  
       Without Program (Untruncated)   With  Program  (Truncated) 
    exp. tot. w  Var tot. w Trun. Point via NISA exp. tot. w  Var tot. w
 (avg 1991-2002)                 
 MN   866075473.1 1.86285E+17  623944363  950629289.6  1.032E+17 
 SK   2669532172 9.55541E+17  1818619244  2786305430 6.12601E+17 
 AB   2093913300 9.51241E+17  1359337213  2224025282 5.65744E+17 
            
 (avg 2003-2006)      Trun. Point via CAIS   
            
 MN   903051008.2 1.64206E+17  866432564.4  1057004360 6.49271E+16 
 SK   1788496668 7.58286E+17  2136169712  2391969105 2.32678E+17 
 AB   2036763336 2.47855E+17  2015502308  2491437718 8.95402E+16 
Notes: exp. tot. w=expected total wealth; Var tot. w=variance of total wealth; Trun.=Truncation. 




Tables 3 and 4 present the simulation results for crops in which the coefficients of the 
expected total wealth (wealth effect) and total profit variance (insurance effect) are statistically 
significant (Spring wheat, Barley, Rye, Peas and Canola). As it can be seen, the source of effects 
of the NISA and CAIS on farmers’ planting decisions in the prairie vary among crops, they 
affect spring wheat acreage through both wealth and insurance effects, barley and rye through 
the wealth effect and peas and canola through the insurance effect. 
As Table 3 shows, NISA has considerably increased the acreage allocated to spring wheat 
in the prairie provinces. During 1991-2002, spring wheat acres increased on average by 9.25 
percent in Manitoba, 5.34 percent in Saskatchewan and 11.12 percent in Alberta. Although both 
the wealth and insurance effects have a statistically significant role in acreage increase for spring 
wheat, the insurance effect is the major reason for the acreage response. Our results suggest that 
barley acres has decreased through the wealth effect as a result of NISA implementation. This 
effect, however, is small (0.28, 0.11 and 0.10 percent in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, 
respectively). The decrease in acreage can also be seen in the case of canola, however, this 
reduction is due to the insurance effect. Based on the results, canola acreage has considerably 
decreased by 11.46, 8.75 and 12.63 percent in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, 
respectively. 
In the period of NISA implementation, peas acres have significantly increased through 
the insurance effect; on average by 15.18 percent in Manitoba, 3.22 percent in Saskatchewan and 
11.02 percent in Alberta. The acres data show that the acreage planted to peas increased in the 
prairies during the  1991-2002 period, and therefore the insurance effect of NISA could be a 
reason for this increase in addition to the factors such as its profitability. Note that the peas 
acreage during 1981-1990 period was on average 119390, 114203 and 10396 acres in Manitoba, 44 
 
Saskatchewan and Alberta respectively. During the NISA implementation these values increased 
to 168863.8, 1472928, 441485 (See Table F1 in Appendix F). An increase in acreage can also be 
seen in the case of rye, however, this increase is due to the wealth effect. Based on the results, 





Table  3:  Simulation Results of NISA (Whole-Farm Program over 1991-2002) 
  Spring Wheat Barley Rye Peas  Canola
MN-NISA Effect %        
 Wealth Effect   0.20 -0.28 1.97  -  - 
 Insurance Effect   9.06 -  -  15.18  -11.46 
 Total Effect   9.25 -0.28 1.97 15.18  -11.46 
       
SK-NISA Effect %        
 Wealth Effect   0.08 -0.11 0.77  -  - 
 Insurance Effect   5.25 -  - 3.22  -8.75 
 Total Effect   5.34 -0.11 0.77 3.22 -8.75 
       
AB-NISA Effect %        
 Wealth Effect   0.19 -0.10 1.22  -  - 
 Insurance Effect   10.93 -  - 11.02  -12.63 





As the Table 4 shows, the effect of CAIS on acreage decisions has a similar  pattern to 
that of NISA, although its magnitude is different. As can be seen, CAIS has considerably 
increased the acreage allocated to spring wheat through both the wealth and insurance effects in 
the prairie provinces. Spring wheat acres expanded during 2003-2006, on average by 14 percent 
in Manitoba, 10.67 percent in Saskatchewan and 8.90 percent in Alberta. An expansion in 
acreage can also be seen in the cases of rye and peas. This increase in rye acreage is due to the 
wealth effect while the peas acreage increase is attributed to the insurance effect. Based on the 
results, peas acreage has considerably increased by 23.82, 2.72 and 5.50 percent in Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan and Alberta, respectively. 
In contrast, in the period of CAIS implementation over 2003-2006, the acreage planted to 
barley and canola have decreased, the former through the wealth effect and the latter through the 
insurance effect. The insurance effect of CAIS led to a considerable decline in canola acreage, on 
average by 10.77 percent in Manitoba, 10.67 percent in Saskatchewan and 7.81 percent in 
Alberta. In general, except for few cases, it seems that CAIS has affected the acreage decisions 





Table  4:  Simulation Results of CAIS (Whole-Farm Program over 2003-2006) 
     Spring Wheat  Barley Rye Peas  Canola
MN-CAIS Effect %        
 Wealth Effect   0.47 -0.66 3.49  -  - 
 Insurance Effect   13.53 -  - 23.82  -10.77 
 Total Effect   14.00 -0.66  3.49 23.82  -10.77 
       
SK-CAIS Effect %        
 Wealth Effect   0.57 -0.55 3.97  -  - 
 Insurance Effect   10.10 -  -  2.72  -10.67 
 Total Effect   10.67 -0.55  3.97  2.72 -10.67 
       
AB-CAIS Effect %        
 Wealth Effect   0.72 -0.40 4.26  -  - 
 Insurance Effect   8.18 -  - 5.50  -7.81 





5  Conclusion 
 
The shift of the farm subsidies toward programs classified as being decoupled income 
supports in the WTO’s URAA  raises the question of their true impact on production and trade. 
In this study, we measured the acreage effects of the Canadian whole farm programs under 
uncertainty. Based on the theoretical discussions regarding the role of the insurance effect in 
acreage decisions, we extend the theoretical restrictions examined by Chavas and Holt (1990) 
which enables us to include this effect in our model specification. Hence, we modified the 
expected utility maximization framework (under the hypothesis that farmers are risk averse) 
developed by Chavas and Holt (1990) and derived three distinct effects: market effects, the 
wealth effect, and the insurance effect. Government payments are incorporated into the model 
through truncation of the probability distribution of profits. Specifically, the whole-farm 
programs truncate the total (farm) profit distribution, which affect the expected total wealth and 
variance of total wealth. Within this model, a system of nine crop equations, for spring wheat, 
durum wheat, oats, barley, rye, peas, flax, canola and hay, is provided and all the relevant 
elasticities of acreage allocation with respect to the exogenous variables are estimated.  
Based on the estimated results, the coefficients of expected total wealth and variance of 
total wealth were statistically significant in the whole system which implies that the whole-farm 
programs are production and therefore trade distorting and are not actually decoupled. The 
estimated statistically significant coefficients (for expected total wealth and variance of total 
wealth variables) were then used to simulate the impact of the NISA and CAIS programs. The 
NISA and CAIS programs have increased the acreage allocated to spring wheat, rye and peas 
while they have decreased the acreage for barley and canola in the prairie provinces. During 
1991-2002, spring wheat acres increased, mostly through the insurance effect, on average by 49 
 
9.25 percent in Manitoba, 5.34 percent in Saskatchewan and 11.12 percent in Alberta under the 
NISA. Under the CAIS, spring wheat acres expanded during 2003-2006; on average by 14 
percent in Manitoba, 10.67 percent in Saskatchewan and 8.90 percent in Alberta. In the  NISA 
period, peas acres increased, through insurance effect, on average by 15.18 percent in Manitoba, 
3.22 percent in Saskatchewan and 11.02 percent in Alberta. Based on the results, under CAIS 
peas acreage increased considerably; by 23.82, 2.72 and 5.50 percent in Manitoba, Saskatchewan 
and Alberta, respectively. Our results suggest that canola acreage has considerably decreased by 
11.46, 8.75 and 12.63 percent in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, respectively under the 
NISA, while the reductions are 10.77, 10.67 and 7.81 percent under the CAIS. In general, our 
estimates confirm that the size and the direction of the acreage effect of direct payments are 
strongly influenced by the insurance effect. Therefore, for the whole farm programs, the total 
impact of the effects related to risk is important.   
  Hence, the implementation of decoupled programs calls into question the current 
definition of the Green Box payments in the WTO agricultural negotiations. There is a need to 
reevaluate the eligibility criteria of the Green Box payments. Current eligibility criteria do not 
take into account the farmer’s response under uncertainty and are typically based on the market 
effects of policies. Since the size of the risk effects is relevant, especially the insurance effects, 
policies that are considered decoupled under the current WTO definition may not actually be 
production and trade neutral. 
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  APPENDICES 
  
 
  Appendix A. Background: Canadian Agricultural Stabilization and Support 
Programs 
 
Canadian agriculture has a long history of government involvement in programs designed 
to stabilize prices and incomes. From the time of Confederation in 1867 until the 1930s, 
identifying and attracting quality immigrants was a significant feature of national policy for 
agriculture. The Great Depression of the 1930s and the simultaneous droughts and insect damage 
throughout the North American Great Plains led to action by the federal government. In January 
1935, the Canada government announced reforms which implied government intervention (as 
control and regulation) and, in turn the development of a policy for agriculture in Canada. From 
1950s, government activities were transformed from simply control and regulation to direct 
provision of subsidies. In what follows, we will review agricultural stabilization and support 
programs in Canada starting in 1950. 
After the Agricultural Products Board Act 1951 which stated that government should 
have a role to play in supporting agricultural prices and incomes, the federal government put into 
effect the Agricultural Stabilization Act (ASA) in 1958. ASA was the first Act in Canada which 
allocated direct payments to farmers that were fully funded by the Canadian government based 
on a specific formula  to stabilize the low prices of a predetermined set of farm commodities. 
Under this Act, the federal government provided direct subsidies for nine commodities (cattle, 
hogs, sheep, butter, cheese, eggs, wheat, oats and barley not produced in the designated area 
defined in the Canadian Wheat Board Act) when the annual average price for any one of the 
named products dropped below 90 percent of the average price over the three preceding years. 
The amount of money paid under the ASA to farmers was initially small but started to grow 51 
 
during a period of  inflation  in Canada starting in 1975. Since western farmers felt that price 
stabilization under ASA was not sufficient (in many years, the Canadian Wheat Board quotas for 
wheat, barley and durum were constraining, thus farmers could not deliver and get stabilization 
payments for all of their production), the WGSA was put in place to help prairie farmers stabilize 
their crop income. After the introduction of the Western Grain Stabilization Act in 1976, western 
grains were removed from the Agriculture Stabilization Act. 
A second important policy was put in place through the Crop Insurance Act, 1959. Based 
on this Act, the Federal Government provided funds to the provinces to operate subsidized crop 
insurance programs within each province. The Crop Insurance Act was the first agricultural 
support program which introduced the concept of cost sharing between the federal and provincial 
governments. Protection offered under the crop insurance program only insured 60 percent of 
long-term yields. In 1996, the Federal Crop Insurance Act was amended in an attempt to increase 
farmer participation in the program. Since 1996, the insurance yield coverage level available to 
farmers had been increased from 60 percent of the long-term, average-area yield to 80 percent of 
the long-term, average-area yield. Also, the federal contribution to farmer premiums increased 
from 20 percent to 25 percent. Since all crop insurance contracts guarantee a price, in 1996 
government began to offer insurance to farmers that was based on a futures price. 
In 1976, the Western Grain Stabilization Act (WGSA) was passed to provide crop 
income stability for  western grains and oilseeds. Under the WGSA, the total value of payout to 
all farmers in a given year was based on producers’ eligible grain sales. Payment were made 
when aggregate net cash flow (cash receipts minus cash variable costs) from eligible grain 
(wheat, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, canola and mustard seed; from 1988 nine crops are added to 
the seven previously covered − triticale, mixed grains, sunflower, safflower, buckwheat, peas, 52 
 
lentils, fababeans, canary seed) sales were less than the average net cash flow over the previous 
five years. The individual farmer’s share of this payout was then determined by comparing the 
farmer’s contributions to the programme (levies) in the current and the previous two years with 
total levies of all farmers over the same period. One third of programme costs were paid by 
farmers, and participation in the programme was optional. The WGSA was the first support 
program with fixed producer-federal government shares, and a composite of commodities; not 
support for each specific commodity. Under the WGSP the payouts were not large until after the 
grain trade wars of 1985. The program built up a large surplus in the early 1980s. In 1984, the 
payout triggers were changed to allow greater payouts to producers. However, the large payouts 
in the late 1980s led to a deficit in the WGSP fund. It was subsequently replaced with a new 
program called the Farm Income Protection Act (which had three components, the Gross 
Revenue Insurance Program, the Net Income Stabilization Account, and Crop Insurance). 
As a result of the low grain prices in 1986, the government of Canada announced a new 
program was called the Special Canadian Grains Program. Under this program, $1 billion in 
1986, $1.2 billion in 1987, $750 million in 1988, and $1 billion in 1989 were paid to producers. 
With several years of ad hoc programming experience and little improvement foreseen by 
governments, the federal and provincial governments began a major policy review in 1989. The 
economic difficulty felt by governments was that farmers in the crops sector were increasingly 
making planting and crop choice decisions based on governmental programming rather than 
market signals. The product of these debates was the Gross Revenue Insurance Program (GRIP) 
in 1991. 
The Gross Revenue Insurance Program (GRIP) was the first program introduced under 
the Farm Income Protection Act. In GRIP, farmers were guaranteed a per acre gross return on 53 
 
whatever crop they grew. A farmer would pay a premium to the insure gross revenues of a crop 
at a certain level, and he/she would receive an indemnity when area revenues fell below the 
coverage level. Premiums were subsidized (typically producers would pay 1/3 of the insurance 
premium). There were two payouts that compromised GRIP: (1) revenue insurance and (2) crop 
insurance. The program guaranteed producers their long-term average yield. The guaranteed 
price was set by an indexed moving average price. This index was an average of prices from the 
previous fifteen years, lagged by two years, indexed by a farm input price index which was used 
to index the grain price by a cost of production formula. As shown in figure 1, revenue insurance 
provided revenue protection between the level offered by crop insurance and the target revenue 
set by GRIP. Crop insurance provided a production guarantee equal to 70 percent of the 
producer’s normal production times the price listed in the crop insurance contract. To collect the 
revenue insurance, the market revenue had to be below the target revenue.  
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Saskatchewan had withdrawn from the program just eighteen months after it was 
implemented, because it was considered too expensive for the province and it was poorly 
designed. By 1999, the only province still in GRIP was Ontario. 
The Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA), which has tripartite (federal, provincial 54 
 
and farmer) funding, was the second program introduced in the Farm Income Protection Act. The 
stated purpose of the Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA) program of 1991-2002 was to 
encourage farmers to save more funds in high income years for use in low income years, so as to 
smooth incomes over time (this is similar to the objective of the WGSA. Unlike WGSA, each 
participant has an individual NISA account). NISA is a voluntary farm income safety net 
scheme, where farmers can set aside money in individual accounts which is then matched by 
federal and provincial government. A farmer can contribute up to 3 percent of eligible net sales 
as savings to a Fund one NISA account and the federal and provincial governments generally 
make a matching contribution to a Fund two NISA account for the individual (2 percent from the 
federal government and 1 percent from the provincial government). Matching funds earn a 
competitive interest rate, but the farmer’s own deposits receive a 3 percent interest bonus paid by 
government. In addition, a farmer can contribute up to an additional 20 percent of eligible net 
sales to his Fund one NISA account. These additional farmer contributions are not matched by 
government, but they earn the 3 percent interest bonus from government. Farmer contributions 
are not tax deductible. All interest from both accounts is accumulated in Fund two. The 
maximum net sales for the qualifying matching government contribution is set at Cdn $250,000 
per farm. 
In years of declining income, farmers can withdraw funds from their NISA accounts in 
amounts determined by either one of two trigger mechanisms. Under the stabilization trigger, if, 
in tax year, the farm income falls below 70 percent of the previous three-year average, a farmer 
may withdraw money from his NISA account. Under the second trigger, if the farmer's net farm 
income falls below Cdn $10,000, the farmer may choose to withdraw his money from his NISA 
account. In all cases, a farmer’s NISA account cannot be in deficit. This trigger was increased in 55 
 
1999 to Cdn $20,000 per farm or Cdn $30,000 for cases in which the NISA account was held as 
a partnership. 
In response to the drop in grains and oilseed prices, in 1998, the federal government 
introduced a temporary farm income support program called Agricultural Income Disaster 
Assistance (AIDA). This program was designed to meet the criteria of the WTO Annex for 
Green Box. When farmers’ net income fell below 70 percent of their three-year, moving–average 
net income they become eligible for a pay-out (net income below zero is not included in the 
averaging process). The cost share on this program was 60 percent from the federal government 
and 40 percent from the provincial government. Since AIDA was costly in terms of the number 
of accountants and government employees needed to manage the individual farmers’ AIDA 
application (which result in farmers receiving less than the full benefits of the program), the 
Canadian government in 2001 announced the Canadian Farm Income Program (CFIP). Even 
though CFIP replaces AIDA, it is similar to it. 
The Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS), which is now Canada’s single 
safety net program, was approved in late 2003 in place of the Net Income Stabilization Account 
(NISA), Canadian Farm Income Plan (CFIP) and related provincial programs. A production 
margin is intended to reflect revenues and expenses that are directly related to production for the 
firm and is calculated by subtracting farmer’s total allowable expenses from his total allowable 
income. A reference production margin is an average of the five previous production margins for 
the farmer, excluding the high and low margins. A CAIS payment is triggered when a farmer’s 
program year production margin declines below his reference margin (CAIS payouts are based 
on farm specific losses relative to reference margin rather than on a regional measure of loss as 
in the Western Grain Stabilization Act). The greater the decline in margin, the greater the 56 
 
payment. Payments are financed from farmer deposits and government contributions, and shares 
vary with the difference relative to the reference margin, the amount of government funds the 
farmer will receive is determined by the extent of his margin decline. As shown in figure 2, the 
program measures the extent of farmer decline using three tiers, with Tier 1 representing the 
smallest decline, farmer deposits cover 1/2 of 0 to 15 percent loss, Tire 2, farmer deposits cover 
3/10 of 15 to 30 percent loss, and Tier 3 representing the largest decline, farmer deposits cover 
1/5 of loss greater than 30 percent. The government finances 60 percent of negative production 
margins. The share of a farmer is inversely proportional to loss. Farmer deposits must be a 
minimum of 14 percent of the current reference production margin; these deposits are not a 
premium and the farmer gets the money back. 
 
Figure  2:  The Mechanics of the CAIS  
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Appendix B. Untruncated Mean, Variance and Covariance of Profits 
 
By assuming that both price ( i p ) and yield per acre ( i y ) are random variables (to reflect 
not only price risk, but also production risk facing producers) and costs of production for ith 
crop ( i c ) are constant, we can derive the untruncated expected profit for ith crop as follows:  
  i i i i i i i i i i i i i c y E p E y p Cov c y p E c y p E E − + − − ) ( ). ( ) , ( = ) ( = ) ( = ) ( = π π  (31) 
 
To analyze supply behavior under risk, assumptions about the expectations of prices 
() ( i p E ) and yields ( ) ( i y E ) are needed. We can use adaptive expectations for the normalized 
prices and yields. That is,  
  1 , 1 = ) ( − − + t i i it t p p E α  (32) 
 where  ) ( = 1 , − − t i it i p p E α  as measured by the sample mean of the past differences between 
observed prices and prices in the previous period. This computed mean is updated in each period. 
The assumption stated in (32) that expected prices are a function of the average price of the 
previous year has been successfully employed in previous research (e.g., Houck et al., 1976; 
Chavas, Pope, and Kao, 1983). Similarly, adaptive expectations for the normalized yields is  
  1 , 1 = ) ( − − + ′ t i i it t y y E α  (33) 
 where  ) ( = 1 , − − ′ t i it i y y E α  as measured by the sample mean of the past differences between 
observed yields and yields in the previous period. This computed mean is updated in each period. 
The covariance measure used for normalized prices and yields is  
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 where  j ω  represents the declining weighting scheme. These measurements of covariance are 
also consistent with those used previously in the literature (e.g., Chavas and Holt, 1990; Coyle, 
Wei and Rude, 2008; Lin and Dismukes, 2007). By calculating relations (32), (33), and (34) and 
replacing into relation (31) we can calculate the untruncated expected profits for ith crop 
( ,9 1,2, = i ) in $/acre in each province (Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta) over years 1971-
2006
37. 
We follow Bohrnstedt and Goldberger (1969) to calculate untruncated crop profit 
variance and covariance (σ ) for the product of two random variables. Variance for this bivariate 
profit distribution is (crop costs are assumed constant, resulting in gross revenue and net revenue 
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If  i p  and  i y  are bivarite normally distributed, 
2 2 2 )) , ( 2( ) ( ). ( = ] )) ( .( )) ( [( i i i i i i i i y p Cov p Var y Var y E y p E p + − −  and all third and higher 
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 where  ) ( i p Var  is price variance and  ) ( i y Var  is yield variance and can be calculated as  
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 Expression (37) states that the variance of price is a weighted sum of the squared deviations of 
past prices from their expected values, with declining weights. These measurements of price risk 
are also consistent with those used previously in the literature (e.g., Lin, 1977; Traill, 1978; Lin 
and Dismukes, 2007). When price and/or yield are not bivariate normally distributed, (36) 
represents an approximation of variance of profits. The amount of error introduced into variance 
calculations by using (36) instead of (35) depends on the degree to which the price and/or yield 
distributions are non-normal, in combination with the magnitude of price and yield variance. 
The untruncated covariance of crop profit between two crops is  
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 where  ) , ( j i p p Cov  is covariance between prices for crops i and  j, with other covariances 
defined in a similar manner and all covariances in relation (39) can be calculated using a relation 
similar to (34). Relation (39) collapses to (36) when  j i = . Thus, relation (39) could be used to 
calculate each element of a  n n×  untruncated variance-covariance matrix (σ ), where n is the 
number of crops included in the analysis. Using relation (39), we can calculate the untruncated 
covariance of cross-commodity profits between ith and  jth crops ( ,9 1,2, = i ) in each province 60 
 
(Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta) over years 1971-2006
38. 
Both expected profits and the corresponding elements of the variance-covariance matrix 
are influenced by the existence of the government programs, which truncates the profit 
distribution at the minimum profit level. Assuming a multivariate normal distribution for profits, 
the computed expected profits, variances and covariances should be corrected for this truncation. 
The influence of government programs on the subjective probability distribution of profits for 
each crop ( ) ( = i i i i c y p − π ) is considered by crop-specific programs, Crop Insurance, 
Agricultural Stabilization Act, and GRIP, over the period of our study. Therefore, a change in the 
government crop-specific support programs induces changes in the expected profits and in their 
variability (variance-covariance matrix) for each crop. Now, assume that each random variable 
profit )) ( = ( i i i i c y p − π  is truncated from below at a level  i H  (which is the higher guaranteed 
profit by crop-specific programs
39). Expressions (43), (44), and (45) in Appendix C provide an 
analytical evaluation of the truncation effect of a crop-specific program on the mean, variance, 
and covariance of commodity profits. 
 
   
                                                       
38In our study, since the number of crops is nine, thirty six untruncated covariance of cross-commodity profits and 
nine variance of profits over 1971-2006 for each province have been calculated. 
39The calculation of guaranteed profit by crop-specific government support programs is discussed in the text. 61 
 
Appendix C. Truncated Mean, Variance and Covariance of Profits: Incorporation 
of Government Programs into the Model 
 
The acreage decision model (6) involves uncertainty about prices  p  and yields  y . In this 
appendix the influence of government programs on the subjective probability distribution of 
profits  Π is considered. The resulting truncation of the subjective probability distribution of 
profits will affect expected profits (Π ) as well as second (σ ) and higher moments of the profit 
distribution. Thus, a support program will influence both profit expectations and the riskiness of 
profit. 
We consider the normal case since the effects of multivariate truncation are best 
understood in the context of a normal distribution (see Johnson and Kotz, 1972). Let 
,...) , ( = 2 1 π π Π  be a vector of normally distributed random profits with mean 
,...) , ( = = ) ( 2 1 π π Π Π E  and variance  ) ( ) ( = Π − Π ′ Π − Π E σ , where E  is the expectation 
operator. Now, assume that each random profit  i π , is truncated from below at a level  i H . Define 
the truncated random profits  































. The mean and 
variance of  i e  are derived in Chavas and Holt (1990). The expected value of  i e , is  
  ) ( ) ( = ) ( = i i i i i h h h e E e Φ + φ  (40) 
 where  (.) φ  and  (.) Φ  are the standard normal density function and distribution function, 
respectively. The second moments of  i e , are given by  
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 and if  j i ≠ ,  
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 The above expressions provide an analytical evaluation of the truncation effect of a support 
program on the mean, variance, and covariance of commodity profits. These results will be used 
to investigate the influence of government programs on crop acreage decisions. Figure C1 
illustrates the effects of government programs on the mean and variance of commodity profit 
distribution. When untruncated expected commodity profits are substantially above the 
guaranteed income by government, the effect of government program on moments of the profit 
distribution will remain at a minimum. However, when truncated expected commodity profits are 
either slightly above the guaranteed income or actually below the guaranteed income, the effects 

























   
The above expressions show that to derive the truncated mean and variance-covariance of 
profits we need an untruncated mean and variance-covariance of profits ( σ , Π ). The formula for 
untruncated mean and variance-covariance of profits were discussed in Appendix B. 
As an example, consider spring wheat (swh) in Saskatchewan in 1997. Untruncated 
expected profit  swh π  and untruncated expected variance of profit  swh σ  have been obtained using 
relations (31) and (36), respectively. Guaranteed profits ($/acre) by Crop Insurance and GRIP 
programs (in 1997 there is no data for Agricultural Stabilization Act because this program has 
been terminated in 1984) for spring wheat have been calculated and then the higher guaranteed 






















φ  and  ( ) swh h Φ  has been calculated by 
) ( swh h NORMSDIST  in Excel which provides the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. Finally, the truncated expected profit and the truncated variance of profit for spring 
wheat in Saskatchewan in year 1997 have been obtained by replacing (40) and (41) into (43) and 64 
 
(44), respectively. 
To calculate the truncated covariance between profits of spring wheat and, for example, 
durum wheat (dwh), the untruncated covariance between spring wheat and durum wheat profits 
dwh swh, σ , the untruncated variances of spring wheat profit  swh σ  and durum wheat  dwh σ  have been 
calculated using relations (39) and (36). Then,  0.5
,




dwh swh σ σ
σ
ρ  has been obtained. 














































dwh swh e Z
−
π
φ ,  ( ) dwh swh k , Φ  and 
( ) swh dwh k , Φ  have been obtained using  ) ( ,dwh swh k NORMSDIST  and  ) ( ,swh dwh k NORMSDIST  in 
Excel.  () () ( ) ( ) dwh swh dwh swh dwh swh h h h h h h F Φ − Φ − + Φ 1 , = ,  in which  ( ) dwh swh h h , Φ  has been obtained 
using the  dwh swh dwh swh h h binormal , , , ( ρ ) command in Stata which returns the joint cumulative 
distribution of the bivariate normal with correlation ρ ; cumulative over (-inf, swh h ] and (-
inf, dwh h ]. Finally, the truncated covariance between spring wheat and durum wheat  profits in 
Saskatchewan in  1997 has been calculated by replacing (42) into (45). 
Therefore, using relations (43)(44) and (45), the truncated expected profit, 
T
j π (which in 
our case of nine crops would be nine individual profit variables), and the truncated covariance of 
cross-commodity profits, 
T
jk σ  (which in our case would be nine individual variance variables and 
thirty six covariance variables), in equation (38) (or (39)) can be constructed in each province 
over 1971-2006. 
Untruncated expected total (farm) profit for crops in $ is  65 
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 in which each term in square bracket has been calculated using relation (31). The untruncated 
variance of total (farm) profit for crops is  
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 in which each term in square bracket has been calculated using relation (36) and (39). 
The influence of government programs on the subjective probability distribution of total 
profits is considered by whole-farm programs, WGSA, NISA, AIDA/CFIP, and CAIS, over the 
period of our study. The resulting truncation of the subjective probability distribution of total 
profits will affect expected total profits as well as second and higher moments of the total profit 
distribution. Thus, government whole-farm programs will influence both total profit expectations 
and the riskiness of total profit (variance). If we assume that each random variable  total profit is 
truncated from below at a level H  (which is the higher guaranteed profit by whole-farm 
programs
40), expressions (43) and (44) in the above provide an analytical evaluation of the 
truncation effect of a whole-farm program on the mean and variance of total profit. 
For example, consider Saskatchewan in 2005. The untruncated expected total profit and 
the untruncated variance of total profit have been obtained using relations (46) and (47), 
respectively. Guaranteed profit ($) by CAIS program (in 2005, WGSA, NISA or AIDA/CFIP 
                                                       
40The calculation of guaranteed profit by whole-farm support programs is provided in the text. 66 
 


















φ  and  ( ) h Φ  has been calculated by 
) (h NORMSDIST  in Excel which provides the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
Finally, the truncated expected total profit and the truncated variance of total profit in 
Saskatchewan in 2005 have been obtained by replacing (40) and (41) in (43) and (44), 
respectively. Therefore, using relations (43) and (44), the truncated expected total profit 
(
T
jt j j A π ∑
9
1 = ) and the truncated variance of total profit (
T




) in equation (38) (or 
(39)) can be constructed in each province for 1971-2006. 
 



























Appendix D. Hypothesized Signs on Model Parameters 
Considering that the allocation of a given amount of land to different crops is similar to 
choosing an optimal portfolio of assets, we use portfolio theory to determine the hypothesized 
relationships between acreage of a given crop and each of the variables in equation (16) 
including profits, variances and covariances. Without loss of generality, by considering a three-
product case, assume that producers choose the portfolio weights that maximize utility U  with 
the common function (i.e. the utility function for profit is quadratic so that mean and variance are 
the only moments relevant to the decision maker’s risky choice)
41: 
 
  W W U τσ
2
1
= −  (17) 
where W  is expected total wealth, τ  shows the coefficient of risk aversion ( 0 > τ ), while all 
risk-averse farmers seek to avoid risk, different farmers have different levels of risk aversion.  
Low values of τ  are consistent with a higher tolerance for risk, while higher values for τ equate 
to higher degrees of risk aversion.   W σ  is the variance of total wealth. We define  ' = A w W Π +  





' = A A A w U σ τ − Π +  (18) 
 where  T A A σ σ = '  is variance of total profit. 
                                                       
41In using the mean-variance model instead of the more general expected utility models, we should note that if the 
returns from a risky portfolio are judged to follow a normal distribution, mean-variance portfolio analysis is relevant 
even if the decision maker's utility function is not quadratic. The reason is that mean and variance-covariance 
completely specify the normal distribution. Therefore, if profits are normally distributed, the decision maker can 
rank alternatives using only two parameters, expected value and variance-covariance, without concern to the higher 
moments of the distribution. Moreover, Levy and Markowitz (1979) have demonstrated that the mean-variance 
model is appropriate as a second-order Taylor series approximation to all risk-averse utility functions. Modeling 
acreage response as in this study is one such application of the mean-variance theory that is being used in 
approximating expected utility as a function of expected profits and variance-covariance of profits. 68 
 
In the three-crop case  k j i , ,  the portfolio return is calculated as: 
 
  k k j j i i A A A A π π π + + Π = '  (19) 
where  i A ,  j A , and  k A  are the portfolio weights of crops i,  j and k, respectively. These are the 
weights that producers adjust to maximize utility. The expected returns are given by  i π ,  j π , and 
k π , respectively. The portfolio variance is calculated as: 
 
  jk k j ik k i ij j i k k j j i i A A A A A A A A A σ σ σ σ σ σ σ 2 2 2 =
2 2 2 2 2 2 + + + + +  (20) 
 where  ij j i ij ρ σ σ σ =  shows the covariance and  ij ρ  is  j i,  crops' return correlation. The standard 
deviations of crops are given by  i σ ,  j σ  and  k σ . Portfolios are chosen by maximizing utility 
subject to the constraint: 
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 Substituting  ) (1 j i A A − −  for  k A  into utility function U  puts the problem in terms of just two 
unknowns  i A  and  j A : 
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The optimal portfolio weight in i,  i A , can be found by setting  0 = / i A U ∂ ∂  and solving for 
i A  which gives:  
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In this solution, the optimal portfolio weight in  i A  is a function of  j A , which is also 
unknown. Setting  0 = / j A U ∂ ∂  and solving for  j A  results in:  
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 (24) 
 
If we assume  X ik k i = 2
2 2 σ σ σ − + ,  Y jk k j = 2
2 2 σ σ σ − +
42,  Z kj ij ik k =
2 σ σ σ σ − + − , 
substituting  j A  of equation (24) in equation (23), after some rearranging, leads to the following:  
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Solving for  i i A π ∂ ∂ /  shows the impact of a change in own return,  i π , on the optimal 
portfolio weight of i and is given by:  
  0 >
) (
= / 2 Z XY
Y
A i i −
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τ
π  (26) 
 Since  0 > Y ,  0 > τ  and  0 > ) (
2 Z XY −
43, then the effect of changes in own return on  i A , 
                                                       
42Since  0 > ) 2 ( = ) (
2 2 2
k i k i k i σ σ σ σ σ σ − + −  and  ik k i ik ρ σ σ σ = ,  1 < < 1 ik ρ − , then  0 > ,Y X . 
43The second-order-condition of the optimization problem in (22) implies   70 
 
0 > / i i A π ∂ ∂ , is positive. The degree of the increase in portfolio weight is dependent upon the 
variances and covariances of crop returns and the risk aversion of the individual producer. The 
effect of changes in cross-returns on  i A ,  j i A π ∂ ∂ /  and  k i A π ∂ ∂ /  cannot be signed. 
The marginal impact of changes in 
2
i σ  on the optimal portfolio weight in i, is given by 
solving for 
2 / i i A σ ∂ ∂ : 
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 Since  0 > Y ,  0 > τ  and  0 > ) )] ( [ )] ( ([
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44, therefore the 
effect of changes in own variance on  i A ,  0 < /
2
i i A σ ∂ ∂ , is negative. The effect of changes in 
cross-variances on  i A ,  j i A σ ∂ ∂ /  and  k i A σ ∂ ∂ /  cannot be signed. 
To find the marginal impact of changes in  ik ρ  on the optimal portfolio weight in i, solve 
for  ik i A ρ ∂ ∂ / , which gives: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                               

































 which gives  0 > ) (
2 Z XY − . 
44Since  i A  implies the weight of crop i in portfolio, it should be positive ( 1 < < 0 i A ). Thus, in equation (25) the 
numerator should have the same sign as denominator. Since denominator is positive ( 0 > ) (
2 Z XY − ), the 
numerator has the positive sign,  0 > ) )] ( [ )] ( ([
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 This reveals the impact that a change in the i and k correlation will have on the optimal weight 
in i. The marginal effect is determined by the variances and covariances of crop returns, the risk 
aversion parameter of the individual producer, and the risk premiums ( k i π π −  and  k j π π − ). 
Although in the three-product case (or N  products case) we can just determine the 
expected sign for own return and variance, it is obvious that in the two crops case there is 
expected sign for all variables because  i j A π ∂ ∂ /  is equal to  i i A π ∂ ∂ − /,  
2 / i j A σ ∂ ∂  is equal to 












Table  E1: Estimated Results 
    Prof swh  Prof dwh  Prof oats  Prof barley  Prof rye  Prof peas  Prof flax  Prof canola  Prof hay  Var swh 
 swh  acre           
Coef.    18331.98**  -1463.29 -2465.47 2515.45 -1591.68 1326.53 351.74  -9318.54**  304.50 -171.10 
Std. Err.    5588.78 2586.99 1665.42 2510.22 1028.97 1085.13 1523.04 2467.16 1229.40  209.28 
  dwh acre            
Coef.    -1463.29 -799.00 -1300.02 2405.98 -432.32 155.44 -316.62  2173.47 477.52  81.07 
Std. Err.    2586.99  2377.59 899.06 1590.82 654.56  730.22 971.50  1506.94  690.03 169.79 
  oats acre            
Coef.    -2465.47 -1300.02 3806.22** 1857.21 1503.99** -672.18 123.80 -537.53 -382.15 -64.01 
Std. Err.    1665.42 899.06 1111.20  1149.69 692.92  499.76 810.66 911.76 703.34  65.21 
  barley acre            
Coef.    2515.45 2405.98 1857.21 -1769.10 -562.44  -19.16 34.05  -1755.30  1215.08  175.05 
Std. Err.    2510.22 1590.82 1149.69 2359.17  810.61  741.53 1049.46  1416.28 923.41  120.15 
  rye acre            
Coef.    -1591.68 -432.32  1503.99**  -562.44  -181.76 -467.11 -700.86 668.67  551.33  8.38 
Std. Err.    1028.97  654.56 692.92 810.61 847.42 382.82 682.38 608.97 630.19  41.36 
  peas acre            
Coef.    1326.53 155.44 -672.18 -19.16 -467.11  27.60 838.03*  -679.10  -576.07  8.91 
Std. Err.    1085.13  730.22 499.76 741.53 382.82 484.74 485.93 680.91 427.07  54.84 
  flax acre            
Coef.    351.74 -316.62 123.80  34.05  -700.86  838.03* 2689.22**  -1906.48**  -2828.36**  56.37 
Std. Err.    1523.04 971.50  810.66 1049.46 682.38  485.93 1043.45 915.36  664.27  74.97 
  canola acre            
Coef.   -9318.54**  2173.47  -537.53  -1755.30  668.67  -679.10 -1906.48**  8454.26** -104.66  338.47** 
Std. Err.    2467.16  1506.94 911.76 1416.28 608.97  680.91 915.36  2100.76  702.32 181.13 
  hay acre            
Coef.   304.50  477.52  -382.15  1215.08  551.33  -576.07 -2828.36** -104.66 1843.24**  -10.99 











Table E1: Continued 
Var dwh  Var oats  Var barley  Var rye  Var peas  Var flax  Var canola  Var hay  tot exp w  tot St. Err. w  lagged acre 
swh acre 
Coef.  151.03 325.00**  -83.34  41.55  -99.47*  108.47 -9.36 -118.03  0.000090**  -0.001375**  0.54** 
Std. Err.  117.89 96.41  122.68 173.37 58.28  81.84 82.10  176.24  0.000047  0.000478  0.05 
dwh acre 
Coef.  -58.92 -13.75  9.41  92.97 -46.00  -117.38** 246.35**  -110.09 -0.000039  0.000296  0.25** 
Std. Err.  88.91 80.55  71.69 114.09  40.29 58.24 67.51  114.60  0.000026  0.000343  0.10 
oats acre 
Coef.  4.96 -51.39 11.10  142.64**  -1.98  5.30 2.11  -79.42  -0.000019  0.000216  0.66** 
Std. Err.  37.05 33.91  39.66  53.51 18.78 25.30 26.82 58.90  0.000015  0.000185  0.08 
barley acre 
Coef.  -19.54  -70.22 -122.06** -38.21  20.13  16.80 4.32  124.42  -0.000040*  0.000097 0.40** 
Std. Err.  62.77 51.03  62.38 106.29  27.53 39.60 43.53 93.82  0.000024  0.000209  0.11 
rye acre 
Coef.  -1.09 9.95  3.02  23.40 2.63 5.84 12.09  -47.25  0.000018**  0.000088 0.85** 
Std. Err.  21.66 19.91  24.44  31.30 12.20 14.84 14.10 38.42  0.000009  0.000076  0.19 
peas acre 
Coef.  6.64 -11.21  -82.26**  -27.53 -9.95 -15.37 6.62 80.92  -0.000031  -0.000100**  0.48** 
Std. Err.  27.91 21.70  31.97  38.08 15.99 17.33 18.48 42.62  0.00002 0.00003  0.08 
flax acre 
Coef.  -33.87 -44.89  -23.30  86.55* -26.94  -58.46** 61.91** 155.39**  -0.000010  -0.000009  0.68** 
Std. Err.  39.63 33.93  42.61  51.80 18.11 28.35 27.58 59.54  0.000015  0.000115  0.09 
canola acre 
Coef.  -315.29** 23.36  359.28**  109.75  25.05 -230.25** -45.21  -156.72  0.000007 0.000956**  0.47** 
Std. Err.  87.48 73.64  88.37 142.57  47.18 55.48 62.41  129.35  0.000031  0.000311  0.06 
hay acre 
Coef.  -66.89**  -33.13 103.12** -25.75 20.49* -18.68 22.86  -203.05**  0.000011  0.000169  1.04** 
Std. Err.  23.30 22.92  30.24  44.01 12.02 19.01 19.37 45.63  0.000010  0.000106  0.07 
Notes: * is significant at 10 percent and ** is significant at 5 percent. Coef.=Coefficient; Std. Err.=Standard Error; prof=expected profit; Var=Variance; swh=spring wheat. 




Table E2: Estimated Results 







Coef.  157.70** 125.38** -59.66 -203.34**  -102.51** -22.98  41.79  -130.83**  91.33** 
Std. Err.  51.72 39.39  37.80  49.75  31.48  21.32  26.19 34.98 30.26 







Coef.  -4.07  -10.85  16.31 50.94* 19.22 -21.21  -23.24  20.07  8.14 
Std. Err.  36.23 24.51  31.00  29.24  33.44  60.73  20.61 29.78 35.53 







Coef.  -22.67  -13.09  30.83*  6.33  -5.78  16.45  -2.79 -4.23 -1.04 
Std. Err.  16.78 14.89  17.81 8.87 11.31 14.80  13.73  9.70  11.35 





Coef.  2.69 3.21  5.98  -18.71  15.62 -2.12  -29.46  -54.60** 
Std. Err.  18.12 15.79  13.22  12.85  15.33 23.42  22.88  28.41 
rye acre   Cov swh,peas   Cov dwh,flax   Cov oats,peas   Cov barl,peas   Cov rye,peas   Cov rye,cano 
Coef.  5.25 -2.45  -3.59**  -0.19  0.62  -1.80 
Std. Err.  3.51 3.13  1.55  4.03  2.80  3.97 
peas acre   Cov swh,peas   Cov swh,cano   Cov swh,hay   Cov dwh,peas   Cov rye,peas   Cov rye,hay 
Coef.  -7.65* 3.45 8.73 -3.54  6.92** -8.09 
Std. Err.  4.77 6.08  11.05  3.79  3.13  8.76 







Coef.  -12.29 31.30** 6.73 -31.80**  -18.98** 16.27**  29.17**  18.38**  -18.41** 
Std. Err.  8.99 8.79  6.41  10.41  9.86 7.94  12.25  7.66  6.47 







Coef.  130.28** 125.64**  -57.68** -95.61** 129.41** -263.06**  58.37**  -56.34  -64.43** 
Std. Err.  45.00 37.65  21.14  18.15  39.62  83.03  21.34 27.14 23.12 








Coef.  1.78 17.69**  5.51  -6.16  16.68** -7.34  3.95  6.11  -14.24 
Std. Err.     5.89 9.11  5.04  7.65  7.83 7.44  2.90  5.58  10.53 75 
 
Table E2: Continued 
   swh acre   Cov barl,rye   Cov barl,flax   Cov barl,hay   Cov rye,peas   Cov rye,cano   Cov peas,flax   Cov peas,cano   Cov peas,hay   Cov flax,hay 
Coef.  -145.58** 42.24  236.13**  -68.18**  144.52** -42.08*  54.60**  106.72**  -100.00** 
Std. Err.  43.46 37.51 63.50 19.35 35.19 25.20  14.06  26.36 41.20 
dwh acre   Cov dwh,hay   Cov oats,flax   Cov oats,peas   Cov barl,peas   Cov barl,flax   Cov barl,cano   Cov rye,peas   Cov rye,flax   Cov rye,cano 
Coef.  56.54* -13.36 -24.83 -32.46  29.51 16.91 37.42**  -25.74  -48.64 
Std. Err.  32.82 11.49 19.02 32.55 56.61 33.91  17.09  27.31 30.99 
oats acre   Cov barl,hay   Cov rye,peas   Cov rye,flax   Cov rye,cano   Cov peas,flax   Cov peas,cano   Cov peas,hay   Cov flax,hay   Cov cano,hay 
Coef.  -16.81 3.69  2.12 -14.89 6.68 -5.08  -21.53*  22.53  14.40* 










flax acre   Cov flax,cano 
Coef.  -7.75 
Std. Err.  5.81 
cano acre   Cov oats,peas   Cov oats,flax   Cov oats,cano   Cov barl,rye   Cov barl,peas   Cov barl,flax   Cov barl,hay   Cov flax,hay 
Coef.  -19.55** -111.25**  27.13  111.04**  95.47** 118.59** -214.77**  40.51 
Std. Err.  8.21 28.82 13.05 40.61 27.14 50.12  51.95  24.79 
hay acre   Cov rye,flax   Cov rye,cano   Cov peas,flax   Cov peas,cano   Cov peas,hay   Cov cano,hay 
Coef.  -1.26 -3.08  3.55  -9.67**  -3.61  -2.14 
Std. Err.     6.08 5.40 7.02 4.87 6.69  4.73          










  Appendix F. 
   
Table  F1:  Simulation of Acreage Changes due to NISA and CAIS 
     Spring wheat Spring wheat Barley Rye  Peas Canola
MN (avg 1991-2002 in acre)           
 Acreage planted   3878979.962 3878979.962 1218804  77672  168863.8 2132517 
 NISA wealth effect    7567.566575   -3373.7  1530.424     
 NISA insurance effect     351347.5948      25631.07  -244377 
             
 SK (avg 1991-2002 in acre)           
 Acreage planted    12394099.38 12394099.38 4307317 236257.8 1472928 5171563 
 NISA wealth effect    10451.20664  -4659.25  2113.596     
 NISA insurance effect    650935.4039      47486.23  -452753 
             
 AB (avg 1991-2002 in acre)           
 Acreage planted    6103573.108 6103573.108 5213515 139168.2  441485  3673997 
 NISA wealth effect   11645.02244  -5191.47  2355.027     
 NISA insurance effect     666996.0041      48657.87  -463923 
  MN (avg 2003-2006 in acre)           
 Acreage planted    2903567.333  935471.3  79945.67  120289  2536772 
 CAIS wealth effect   13778.82499  -6142.74  2786.556     
 CAIS insurance effect     392721.944      28649.36  -273154 
             
 SK (avg 2003-2006 in acre)           
 Acreage planted   9477554.667 9477554.667 4372312 274828.7 2565754 6239714 
 CAIS wealth effect    54010.78315  -24078.6  10922.85     
 CAIS insurance effect     957557.3936      69854.54  -666021 
             
 AB (avg 2003-2006 in acre)           
 Acreage planted    5652759.667 5652759.667 4496388 193236.3  613795  4121030 
 CAIS wealth effect   40693.35721  -18141.5  8229.606     
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